A "Command-and-Control Issue”

Review and Update on the B-52 Nuclear Cruise Missile "Mistake"

http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Components/Art/USNEWS/070905/AP_BOMBERWARHEADS.gif

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Hans Kristensen, an expert on US nuclear forces, said he knew of no other publicly acknowledged case of live nuclear weapons being flown on bombers since the late 1960s.

"It seems so fantastic that so many points, checks can dysfunction," he said. "And we have so many points and checks specifically so we don't have these kinds of incidents."

Kristensen said the air force keeps a computerized command and control system that traces any movement of a nuclear weapon so that they have a complete picture of where they are at any given time.

He said there would be checks and detailed procedures at various points from the time they are moved out of bunkers until they are loaded onto planes, and flown away.

"That's perhaps what is most worrisome about this particular incident is that apparently an individual who had command authority about moving these weapons around decided to so," he said.

"The question is did he just plug in the information that he was moving these to Barksdale, or something else. Who knows?"

"So it's a command and control issue and it's one that calls into question the system, because if one individual can do that who knows what can happen," he said.

Agence France-Presse.

http://www.spacewar.com/2006/070905170556.aigtr3m2.html

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Flying Nuclear Bombs
By Hans M. Kristensen

[read the whole thing!]

"I don't think this is other than a mistake, albeit a serious one. The Advanced Cruise Missile is indeed in the process of being retired, not readied for attack on Iran or anyone else.

The really important implication is beyond the immediate: The United States is in the beginning of a transition to a deep integration of nuclear and conventional capabilities. The Navy has already proposed, and the Air Force is about to propose, replacing some nuclear warheads on long-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads. From outside the weapons will look the same.

The long-range bombers are already highly dual-capable and U.S. B-52s have been used repeatedly to launch conventional Air Launched Cruise Missiles against high-value targets. The Minot bomber was on its way to Barksdale, but it could hypothetically have been on its way to Iraq or - in a potential future conflict - North Korea, Iran or China with nuclear cruise missiles.

If the B-52 incident tells us that the military's command and control system cannot ensure with 100% certainty which weapons are nuclear and which ones are not, imagine the implications of the wrong weapon being used in a crisis or war. "Sorry Mr. President, we thought it was conventional."

The Pentagon has a big job ahead of it in restoring Congressional and public trust in its ability to control the nation's nuclear arsenal." HK

http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/09/flying...ear_bombs_1.php
[read the whole thing!]

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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 05, 2007

The Air Force announced that all flights of fighters and bombers in the United States will be halted on September 14 to allow for a review of procedures.

http://coverthistory.blogspot.com/

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Here's a blog entry with lots of comments worthy of your time...:

http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2007/09/ca...sing-nukes.html

Two excerpts:

"... nukes are governed by a completely different set of rules, for obvious reasons. Those regulations are strictly enforced, with "no tolerance" for mistakes.

First, nuclear weapons are segregated from "ordinary" munitions, with additional layers of security and access control. All personnel involved in the protection, storage, handling and loading of the weapons are carefully vetted through the military's Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). Anyone whose loyalty, judgment or stability comes into question loses their PRP certification, and they're no longer allowed to work around nuclear weapons.

Other safeguards are built into the system as well. There's a very tight chain of control; the device is literally "signed for" at every step of the journey from the weapons storage area to the aircraft, and the two-man "rule" is strictly enforced."

---

"But that still doesn't explain how nuclear-tipped cruise missiles were loaded onto a B-52, flown 1450 miles across the United States, and the mistake wasn't discovered until the bomber reached its destination in Louisiana. With most of the Advanced Cruise Missile fleet (AGM-129) is being retired from operational service, we can assume that Minot crews had been through this drill before. Remove the warhead from the missile, then fly the inert weapon to Barksdale for decommissioning. Retiring the warhead--if that's part of the plan--entails a separate (and completely different) process which does not require a B-52 flight.

Given the elaborate safeguards, security procedures and chain-of-control associated with nuclear weapons, it's difficult to fathom how five warheads made their way onto that Buff and they weren't noticed until it arrived at Barksdale."

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Three comments, an online book preview, and an online file from history:

"The flight and ground crews must have been aware of the changed payload. Right? Every aspect of the aircraft’s inflight performance (takeoff and cruise speeds, all sorts of perfomance settings) would have changed with the presence of no less than six nukes. If the flight crew would not have known about the nukes, they would have risked an accident even at takeoff. It would also mean that the flight crew failed to inspect the plane, or worse, that they did not realize that they were looking at nukes. The aircraft would also have had to have significantly higher fuel quantities on board to make the flight. None of this seems to add up."

— tucker's bow tie · Sep 6, 11:57 AM ·

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"To me, the press has missed the main story here. The concern is not that the weapons were airborne, but that they ever got out of a storage depot and onto a plane in the first place. It begs the question why these system are even co-deployed with delivery systems. We continue to have ICBMs and SLBMs on alert/patrol, and the airborne component is an unnecessary risk. Centralizing all air delivered bombs/ACM away from bomber bases would be an important step and one we shoudl be pusing all states to do.

To say nothing of the fact that the lapse demonstrates risks that may exist elsewhere. I am confident that US controls are the best in the world, and if this can happen here, what do you think is or could go on in Russia, Pakistan, China?"

— Jon Wolfsthal · Sep 6, 01:42 PM ·

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"Given the many operational obstacles, as noted by posters here, to accidentally pulling nukes off the shelf instead of conventional ACMs and loading them onto the plane, the “mistake” must have been higher up the chain of command.

The ground crews must have received an order to load the nuclear-armed ACMs onto the plane. Or thought they did.

The confusion may have been caused by an order for an exercise to prepare for a possible strike that would involve nuclear warheads. The fact that these warheads are variable to low (5 kt) yield is suggestive of the possible intent. The obvious target would be Iran.

Whether the order was initially issued with the intent that nukes were to be used, the fact that this was an exercise to prepare for a possible nuclear strike could have been mistranslated at some level into an order to load live nukes for the exercise.

Alternatively, the order may have been to run the exercise using real nukes, just to see if such an order would be carried out; this only became a “mistake” when someone noted that such an exercise was a violation of established rules, and/or decided to leak a warning of what the Bush gang is up to.'

— Mark Gubrud · Sep 6, 03:23 PM ·

http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1636/us-bom...transport-nukes

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online book preview, with some of the text, reviews, links to purchase, etc. :

"The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons"
By Scott Douglas Sagan
Pinceton University Press, 1995

http://books.google.com/books?id=4pV_wbOnp...t=title#PPP1,M1

"Grounded in original research in U.S. national security archives, [Limits of Safety] reveals a disturbing history of near-catastrophes in the handling of nuclear weapons and bombers. . . . This book is a significant contribution to . . . international security studies, organizational theory, and risk analysis."

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0691021015

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Nixon's Nuclear Ploy: The Vietnam Negotiations and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, October 1969

Washington, D.C. -- December 23, 2002 -- Today, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published an article, "Nixon's Nuclear Ploy,'' by National Security Archive senior analyst William Burr and Miami University historian Jeffrey Kimball, that discloses for the first time one of the Nixon administration's most secret military operations, what became known to insiders as the "Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test."

Among the article's key findings:

Determined to settle the Vietnam War--their "number one problem", irritated by Soviet assistance to North Vietnam, and frustrated by the stalemated Paris peace talks, Nixon and Kissinger had pressed Moscow and threatened North Vietham in order to make progress in the negotiations. In early October 1969, Nixon decided to test the "madman theory" by ratcheting up the readiness level of nuclear forces. If his military moves jarred the Soviets sufficiently, Nixon apparently believed, Moscow might use its leverage to induce Hanoi to meet U.S. terms.

Under Nixon's orders, in mid-October 1969, the Pentagon undertook secretly a series of military measures designed to put U.S. nuclear forces on a higher state of readiness. The JCS Readiness Test was executed secretly so that the public in the United States and allies would not notice it, but Nixon wanted the measures to be detectable, but not alarming, to the leadership of the Soviet Union and its intelligence services.

The CINCs--the commanders-in-chief--did not know, and could not find out why, "higher authority" had ordered them to implement the secret readiness measures. Nevertheless, between 13 and 30 October 1969, they put U.S. nuclear bombers on higher alert, and raised the combat readiness of U.S. tactical aircraft and air defense forces and sent more nuclear missile submarines to sea. Moreover, U.S. destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft carriers engaged in a variety of maneuvers in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Sea of Japan. At the end of October, the Strategic Air Command conducted a nuclear-armed airborne alert exercise over eastern Alaska.

The Pentagon searched for evidence that Moscow had noticed the worldwide readiness measures but little declassified evidence is available showing that the Soviets paid attention. The Soviets may have seen Nixon's moves as a bluff; Moscow made no change in its Vietnam policy.

"Nixon's Nuclear Ploy" will appear in the January-February 2003 print edition of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. It draws upon a longer, fully-sourced and footnoted essay, "Nixon's Secret Nuclear Alert: Vietnam War Diplomacy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, October 1969," that will appear in the January 2003 issue of Cold War History.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB81/press.htm

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http://www.afa.org/magazine/Aug2007/bomber2.jpg

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Selected comments from a very long thread:

Comment by rugger9 | 2007-09-05 23:36:51
"Good comments all. So, we could probably agree there’s no good outcome for this either if we continue on the course this is following now.

One reason there is extreme accountability (aside from the safety issues and so on already noted above) is that we have to keep the Russians in the loop on where weapons are and where they go. It’s part of the SALT and START treaties in terms of the verifications of allowed weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty also has something on this as well. If W is blowing off Putie-poot as well, there will be serious trouble ahead. Putin has a mean streak, has a high level of nationalistic pride, and has already shown he can “do things” as well to those he doesn’t like. Remember the last round of nastiness about the anti-missile batteries in the ex-Warsaw Pact countries. Add to that the joint exercises with the Chinese, and there’s a nasty little stew brewing.

No accident that these were moved, and so the question is did the WH want it out in the news or not?'

Comment by Mad Dogs | 2007-09-06 00:36:41
'My swag scenario:
Pure, unadulterated black propaganda by Deadeye and his uber-loyal Cheneyites.

The propaganda ball bounces thusly:
1. No nukes ever left their storage facilities and the “story” that a B-52 flew ‘em from ND to LA is a deliberate fiction meant for US and Foriegn media publication.
2. Assumes that Iran knows full well that Barksdale, LA is in fact staging area for B-52 Mideast bombing runs.
3. Assumes that Iran knows full well that US nuke arming procedures are “fail-safed” with N-squared signoff and authorization processes.

4. Assumes that Iran knows full well that “if” nukes were loaded, they damm well were authorized by the “highest command authority”.

Comment by Z | 2007-09-06 15:24:35
"I’m seeing an attempt to portray our military personnel as capable of “losing” a WMD so in the event there is a domestic attack using such a weapon there will be an example of how it came to pass that our side messed up and allowed “terrorists” to obtain said weapon. If something big happens involving a WMD of any kind, folks will wonder about the source, who created it, and how it came to be passsed to “terrorists”. We now have a scapegoat - our inept military.

Too messy to blame Russian, or Pakistani, or Mossad blunders or schemes - let’s just blame the idiots in our own military! (who are thankfully very, very bright people at the level we are talking here) “Hey, if they can fly over MY house with nukes and not know it, how can we be sure that our arsenal is safe? Isn’t it just a matter of time before those cunning, determined terrorists outsmart our poor, clumsy defenses and get ahold of the bomb?” Waiting for Iran to come up with a bomb is taking too long. Blaming Iranian agents for the next attack on the U.S. is a no-brainer, they just need a plausible means to have obtained the weapons.

Look for this upcoming review and investigation to find a “history of mismanagement and the subsequent loss of a number of (chemical/biological/nuke) weapons that are unaccounted for and presumably in the hands of enemy actors”

That would make for some serious panic, and we would be BEGGING for a total lockdown of our society until they could be found. We are once again being asked to believe something that is a blatant lie (”oops, we didn’t KNOW those were nukes!” - c’mon!!!), and sadly, many will buy it and not see who is really pulling the strings and why. It’s all too much like a made for TV movie, and a very bad one at that. God bless EVERYONE! Z"

Comment by Michael Gass | 2007-09-06 19:44:00
"Here is a thought:

Instead of thinking that the nuclear missiles would be to hit Iran (which wouldn’t be necessary with 3 carrier strike groups), what if the front loading was to put even more nuclear missiles in the region in case Russia and China intervene (both nuclear powers).

Consider, Israel is trying to goad Syria into a conflict and Bush is trying to hit Iran. We’ve already taken Iraq and Afghanistan.

Russia and China have to be getting edgy since they have held at least two joint military exercises since our invasion of Iraq.

So… the B-52 story isn’t front-loading for Iraq… but to threaten Russia and China with."

Comment by WTFishappening | 2007-09-06 21:47:23
"Google “five nukes” and you get thousands of hits about this story, but Goggle “six nukes” you get about the same count about the same story.

Seems to be a lot of confusion and maybe one missing nuke. I know a lot people in Washington that would love to have a unaccounted for nuke."

Comment by Mick | 2007-09-07 02:54:37
"Here is my attempt at putting all the pieces of the puzzle together.

As many experts have presented on this board with uttermost certainty, it is definately an impossiby that these Nukes would have been moved out by mistake and that is final. This was deliberate.

I think we can also all agree that the Persian Gulf fleet already has Nukes. So it is fair to say that these Nukes were not meant to be used by the Persian Gulf Fleet.

Sadly, I believe they were going to be used covertly to create an event that would have justified retaliation.

Maybe their momentum is stalled for a while, but their intent and coldness is unfathomable.

This leak though gives me hope that maybe enough military people may simply refuse to follow the directives.

If not, if they simply accept to do as they are told, as they are trained to do, then they will pull whatever trigger they are told to pull. Even against women and children, even against their own people.

This all sounds like a bad dream and I will wake up soon.'

http://noquarterusa.net/blog/2007/09/05/st...-iran/#more-817

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tip of the cap to drunkhorse for this:

Exercise prepares BAFB for natural disaster

by Stephanie Bemrose
The Bombardier

8/30/2007 - BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, La. -- Barksdale units discussed their roles in the event of a severe weather crisis situation during a table-top major accident response exercise Wednesday[8/29/07], the second anniversary of Hurricane Katrina.

Team Barksdale members discussed what each base agency would do in preparation for and response to a tornado, according to Maj. Brett Wilkinson, chief of wing exercises.

According to Major Wilkinson, the primary goal of the exercise is to help agencies learn to work together during an accident.

"We need to make sure we know what the other agencies would do during these situations, so throughout the year, we go through different scenarios such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks and aircraft accidents," the major said.

One agency that participated in the exercise is the 2d Bomb Wing Public Affairs, who prepared for the exercise by working with the Delaware Air National Guard public affairs office, according to 1st Lt. Frank Hartnett, deputy chief of the bomb wing's public affairs.

"Three years ago a tornado struck the Delaware Air National Guard base," Lieutenant Hartnett said. "We've been using their real-word experience to better understand what the commander will need to communicate after a tornado."

Major Wilkinson also said the exercise included an emphasis on command and control.

"It's just making sure the right information gets sent up and therefore people can react to that proper communication and provide the necessary help and assistance the first time, every time," the major explained.

During the exercise, public affairs stood ready to provide this communication.

"Keeping people informed is difficult after a major weather disaster, but it can play a big role in helping the recovery effort," the lieutenant added. "If a major storm were to strike Barksdale, the outside community would be very concerned. They'd want to see how we would respond and overcome challenges after a storm. We need to be ready to show our neighbors how we can overcome obstacles and be ready to help defend this country."

Other than the MARE to prepare for the airshow in April, base agencies last participated in a MARE with a suspicious package scenario.

The next MARE is scheduled for Oct. 3 and will include a field exercise.

http://www.barksdale.af.mil/news/story_pri...sp?id=123066600

Tip of the cap to drunkhorse at http://www.911blogger.com/node/11106#comment

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"The reported "loss" of six nuclear-armed stealthy advance cruise missiles (ACMs) flown on the wing pylons of a B-52 from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana on August 30 would represent a complete and unprecedented breakdown in the command and control of nuclear weapons in the United States.

For that reason, there is a belief among many seasoned military experts that
there is much more to this reported story than meets the eye."

-- Wayne Madsen

more at the link:

http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_wa..._remain_ove.htm

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"Some have argued that the leaking of the information constitutes either an attempt to frighten the American people or a psyop against the Iranians. I would not discount the latter possibility. Even so, I think this event is very real, and I am inclined to extrapolate from the initial reports, taken at face value. The nukes were transferred, and thus readied for use. Someone within the intelligence community was so concerned, or outraged, that he turned blabby.

Much evidence indicates that powerful figures within the military and the intelligence community are infuriated by the drive to war with Iran. Consider, for example, the new revelations made by unnamed CIA officers to Sidney Blumenthal about the run-up to the Iraq war. Bush has enemies within the power structure -- a fact which just may prove salvific."

http://cannonfire.blogspot.com/

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"Who here can honestly say they’ve never accidentally misplaced a 150-kiloton nuclear warhead?"

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http://www.tonyrogers.com/news/images/photooftheday/2006_0306_b52_2sm.jpg

(U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Jocelyn Rich)

Airmen secure an ACM cruise missile to a B-52 Stratofortress pylon during an alert generation exercise at Minot Air Force Base, Tuesday, Feb. 28, 2006. The exercise tested cruise missile loading and aircrew response procedures. The ACM is a low-observable, air- launched, strategic nuclear missile with significant improvements over the ALCM-B in range, accuracy, and survivability. Armed with a W80 warhead, it is designed to evade air and ground-based defenses in order to strike heavily defended, hardened targets at any location within any potential enemy's territory. The ACM is designed for B-52H external carriage.

http://www.tonyrogers.com/fun_photos_from_news.htm

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"I think there is more to this than meets the eye. First of all, two or three stripers don't just go out and upload nukes without authorization. Secondly, when I come out to fly and I find 8 crowd pleasers under my wing or in my bomb bay that I had not heard about, I'm not taking the aircraft off until I get some answers. This will more than likely end up at the Wing Level or higher, in the final analysis....."

Posted by: bufdriver on Thu Sep 06, 2007 2:11 am

http://www.thetowntalk.com/apps/pbcs.dll/a...NEWS01/70904040

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kits
User ID: 261878
9/6/2007 2:13 AM

"This much is obvious:
The crew knew what they were loading onto that aircraft. The crew had received orders to load those weapons from someone with the authority to give that order. The pilots also likely knew what weapons had been loaded onto their aircraft. A group of individuals had to load all of those weapons (one person doesn't load six cruise missiles) and it's impossible that none of them noticed what type of weapons they were loading. Whoever gave the crew their orders and whoever "I concurred" knew what they were doing. This was not a mistake. It would be impossible to be a mistake. Odds are incalculable when it comes to the probability of it being a mistake. This was absolutely and without any doubt and intentional act performed by a mass of knowing individuals.

The only possibilities I'm willing to acknowledge due to probability are the following:
The Squadron Commander was performing a ROGUE action.
The Squadron Commander was following orders from above.

Any other belief is childish, to say the least.'

http://www.godlikeproductions.com/bbs/mess...=9/7/07&mpage=1

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Thursday, September 06, 2007

DEBUNKING THE LATEST MOONBAT CONSPIRACY THEORY

"Larry Johnson's "inside" source, with apologies to the late Sterling Hayden (photo courtesy Dave Typinski's Dr. Strangelove page).

When the press reported last week's inadvertent "transfer" of six Air Force nuclear warheads from North Dakota to Louisiana, we started watching the clock. It was only a matter of time, we figured, before the left-wing fringe came up with a conspiracy theory to explain the "real reasons" behind the movement.

And sure enough, we have a winner. Just hours after the story broke, former CIA officer (and frequent Bush Administration critic) Larry Johnson weighed in with this theory at TPMCafe, guaranteed to titillate the Kos Kids and Moonbat Brigade.

According to Mr. Johnson and his "sources," the transfer of six nuclear-tipped advanced cruise missiles (ACMs) on that B-52 was no accident. Seems that we're "staging" nuclear weapons for The Next War With Iran. Cue the sinister music as he explains:

Why the hubbub over a B-52 taking off from a B-52 base in Minot, North Dakota and subsequently landing at a B-52 base in Barksdale, Louisiana? That’s like getting excited if you see a postal worker in uniform walking out of a post office. And how does someone watching a B-52 land identify the cruise missiles as nukes? It just does not make sense.

So I called a old friend and retired B-52 pilot and asked him. What he told me offers one compelling case of circumstantial evidence. My buddy, let’s call him Jack D. Ripper, reminded me that the only times you put weapons on a plane is when they are on alert or if you are tasked to move the weapons to a specific site.

Then he told me something I had not heard before.

Barksdale Air Force Base is being used as a jumping off point for Middle East operations. Gee, why would we want cruise missile nukes at Barksdale Air Force Base. Can’t imagine we would need to use them in Iraq. Why would we want to preposition nuclear weapons at a base conducting Middle East operations?

His final point was to observe that someone on the inside obviously leaked the info that the planes were carrying nukes. A B-52 landing at Barksdale is a non-event. A B-52 landing with nukes. That is something else.

Sounds reasonable, right? After all, Barksdale was the launching point for long-distance "round-robin" B-52 missions flown during Operation Desert Storm and the air war against Serbia. If those diabolical Bushies are planning to hit Iran--and use nukes--why, it only makes sense to stockpile them at Barksdale.

Unfortunately for Mr. Johnson and his fellow theorists, their notion has more holes than that proverbial block of Swiss. Not only is the theory far-fetched, it becomes downright laughable, when analyzed in the context of military planning and current operations.

First, we must confess that Barksdale AFB is a "jumping off point" for Middle East operations. But so is Moody AFB, Georgia; Fort Drum, New York, Virginia's Norfolk Naval Station and any other DoD installation that deploys personnel, equipment and other resources to the Middle East. Barksdale's B-52s have been deploying to the region for years, but so have the F-15s from Langley, the F-16CJs from Shaw, KC-135s from MacDill, and scores of other aircraft (and crews) from other Air Force bases. Barksdale is no more of a staging base for the Middle East than any military installation supporting the GWOT.

Secondly, the idea of "prepositioning" nukes in Louisiana for a strike on Iran is equally preposterous. Moving the nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from Minot to Barksdale puts them only 1400 miles closer to their supposed targets. On a 30-hour round-robin mission, that's nothing--you might save a single tanker sortie and about 30,000 pounds of jet fuel. Besides, those long-distance, round-trip missions are largely for demonstration purposes. For an air campaign against Iran, the Buffs would be based much closer, at bases in the U.K. and Spain, and Diego Garcia, the British-controlled atoll in the Indian Ocean.

As for the "nuclear option," why move the ACMs from North Dakota when same weapons are available at Barksdale? The Louisiana base is home of the 2nd Bomb Wing, the largest unit of its type in the Air Force. Manned by active duty and reserve personnel, the 2nd Bomb Wing operates (and maintains) the bulk of our B-52 fleet. The same weapons available for Buffs at Minot are also available at Barksdale, presumably in even greater quantities.

And, it's a badly-kept secret that the U.S. maintains nuclear weapons at locations outside the United States. Assuming that we actually plan to attack Iran--and use nukes in the process--our strike options are not limited to the aircraft and weaponry at Barksdale AFB. Besides, why make a missile that's being phased out--the AGM-129--the centerpiece of projected strikes against Iran? A weapon facing imminent retirement (virtually all ACMs are expected to be decommissioned by 2008) is more difficult to operate and maintain, making it, potentially, less reliable in combat. Suffice it to say, we have lots of targeting options for Iran (and other adversaries) that don't involve a missile heading for the bone yard, and a bomber that rolled off the Boeing assembly line in 1962.

Finally, it's worth noting that a B-52 flight is a relatively inefficient way to "stage" or "preposition" nukes. You can cram many more weapons into the cargo bay of a C-5 or C-17, and move them with less chance of detection. We were once involved in the removal of tactical nukes from a location outside the CONUS and none of those weapons were transported by combat aircraft. Military Airlift Command (the forerunner of today's Air Mobility Command) C-141s did the job, quickly, quietly and efficiently.

But those considerations don't exactly square with the latest Moonbat conspiracy theory. We hate to disappoint the Kos crowd, but the reasons for the Minot snafu are rooted in training, leadership and accountability, not some neocon plot to "nuke" Tehran."

Labels: USAF nuclear weapons snafu; Barksdale AFB; Minot AFB; B-52H; Larry Johnson

# posted by Spook86 @ 7:50 AM

http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2007/09/de...conspiracy.html

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Great Circle Routes from Minot and Barksdale to Tehran

http://gc.kls2.com/cgi-bin/gc?PATH=KMIB+-O...LOR=&MAP-STYLE=

http://gc.kls2.com/cgi-bin/gc?PATH=KBAD+-O...LOR=&MAP-STYLE=

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"Such “advanced” cruise missiles can… easily enter elevator shafts to deep underground nuke sites and detonate an actual nuclear bomb at depth of sufficient power to kill everyone and destroy the entire facility…"

66 posted on 09/05/2007 10:48:16 AM PDT by Vn_survivor_67-68

"To: Vn_survivor_67-68
Been hearing the EAM messages all evening long. A lot of people saying it is just routine testing...but when the traffic increases from several msgs a night to dozens an hour...something is up. Either it is a signal for intel services around the globe to take notice, or actually nuclear assets around the world being given orders."

67 posted on 09/05/2007 10:52:58 AM PDT by BurbankKarl

"To: Mr. Silverback
Well, let's assume this actually happened and I see no particular reason why it's not true. Psyops about weapons moved accidently are not nearly as scary as weapons moved intentionally, so I don't by this proposition.

Having been a 463x0 nuclear weapons specialist. (I believe the AFSC is now called 2W2), I cannot believe under any circumstances that this happened by accident and for several reasons.

First, unless things have changed, an order to move any conventional weapons would have been assigned from job control to a team of 461x0s (conventional bomb freaks/EOD) not 463x0s. A 461 isn't going to get into a "no lone zone" such as an igloo containing nukes. It's simply impossible. You cannot open an igloo without two 463s each with his own set of keys (red lock and blue lock) stored at job control in a two lock safe. While these keys are being obtained, a daily "code number" is memorized and a team of two Security Police escort these people to the igloo.

Once there, the SPs open a locked phone box and plug in a handset directly wired back to job control. Each "red lock - blue lock" 463 verifies the code of the day over the phone. Simple process, if the code is 65 and job control tells you 30, you respond with 35 (30+35=65). The other half of the "two-man, no lone zone team" gets another number to which he responds with a number that adds to the original code.

While all this is happening the SPs are on the radio with job control waiting for the go ahead to basically not shoot you. Anything goes wrong and the SPs jack you up, period.

Secondly, if job control gives this job to a 461, he's not going to have the vaguest idea what to do.

Thirdly, the Security Police work around and get to know all the people in a given WSA and they will immediately be more than a bit curious why a conventional handler is being assigned the task of checking out some nukes.

Fourth, a 461 simply doesn't have access to the safe containing the red and blue keys.

Fifth, even if somehow a 461 managed to get into a red igloo, the first thing he is going to notice is that the configuration for storing a handful of nukes is considerably different than conventional weapons. You can pack conventional weapons as tight as you please, NOT NUKES. In fact when we moved the W56 warheads, we moved it on C-141 transport planes. Big airplanes, and we only moved three at a time and the center of the pits had to be a certain distance apart from each other. Same thing hold true in an igloo.

Sixth through tenth, the reverse holds true too. That is if JC hands a 463x0 and order to move a convention weapon, we simply tell them "it's not my job."

Eleventh: If the job is for a 463 (nuke puke) to transport real live nukes, they will go get them, bring them back to the maintenance bay assigned and one by one disassemble them for packing. Not a trivial feat BTW. They are no more going to run them up on the flight line and load them on pylons than you are going to get up one morning to go to work and climb into your neighbors car in his garage and drive it down the highway.

Basically there had to be not one, but several protocols broken for this to happen by accident. And that's a serious problem for the Air Force. For it to happen intentionally required a conspiracy among several highly trained people controlled under a program that used to be called HRP-99. (Human Reliability Program) We were medically evaluated more often than most, were under scrutiny more than most for any odd ball mood swings, we all had Top Secret Restricted Data or higher clearances, FBI background investigations and Lord knows what else. Plus, why would someone do this intentionally?"

166 posted on 09/05/2007 11:22:38 PM PDT by HawaiianGecko

"To: HawaiianGecko
quote: 'Plus, why would someone do this intentionally?'

"That's the only reason the leak-check/psyops theories make any sense. If this couldn't have happened by mistake, and there's no reason for someone to do this intentionally, all that's left is head games."

168 posted on 09/05/2007 11:49:06 PM PDT by Mr. Silverback

http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/1891498...ts?q=1&;page=51

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'The likelihood of an accidental detonation is nearly impossible. The Permissive Action Link, an electronic arming code requiring a two-operator insertion of two different codes within a specified time with an automatic lockout, would have prevented the warheads from ever being armed, but it isn't explosion or detonation that presents the problem.

"The main risk would have been the way the Air Force responded to any problems with the flight because they would have handled it much differently if they would have known nuclear warheads were onboard," he said.

Because in the event of a catastrophe a plutonium leak is going to do more than make the corn [in] South Dakota grow bigger, especially if the B-52 had fallen out of the sky, for any reason, over a densely populated area."

http://libertystreetusa.blogspot.com/

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“There is no explanation for this incident other than gross incompetence on the part of the munitions and flight crews. This has nothing at all to do with the Bush administration's commitment to arms control, the military's attention being focused elsewhere or the fact that we have too many nuclear weapons in too many places.

Still, I would wager that if Congress wants to push the issue, we are going to find out that there have been hundreds of similar incidents over the years. (Although I wonder if records are even kept on them, at least in one place.) The Pentagon's "neither confirm nor deny" policy shields those records, and its out-of-sight-out-of-mind attitude about nukes falsely calms the public.”

William Arkin

http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarnin...ml?nav=rss_blog

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"Sir, we’re missing six Cruise Missiles with nuclear warheads...
...other than that, we’re all secure."

http://takeitontherun.blogspot.com/2007/09...e-missiles.html

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“Gentlemen, you can’t fight in here! This is the war room!”

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giant tip of the cap to SnuffySmith for this one:

OpEdNews

Original Content at http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_mi...ert_attempt.htm

September 7, 2007

Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

By Michael Salla

Introduction: The B-52 Incident

On August 30, a B-52 bomber armed with five nuclear-tipped Advanced Cruise missiles traveled from Minot Air Force base, North Dakota, to Barksdale Air Force base, Louisiana. Each missile had an adjustable yield between five and 150 kilotons of TNT which is at the lower end of the destructive capacities of U.S. nuclear weapons. For example, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima had a yield of 13 kilotons, while the Bravo Hydrogen bomb test of 1954 had a yield of 15,000 kilotons. The B-52 story was first covered in the Army Times on September 5 after the nuclear armed aircraft was discovered by Airmen (see: http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/09/mari...ar_B52_070904w/ ). What made this a very significant event was that it was a violation of U.S. Air Force regulations concerning the transportation of nuclear weapons by air. Nuclear weapons are normally transported by air in specially constructed planes designed to prevent radioactive pollution in case of a crash. Such transport planes are not equipped to launch the nuclear weapons they routinely carry around the U.S. and the world for servicing or positioning.

The discovery of the nuclear armed B-52 was, according to Hans Kristensen, a nuclear weapons expert at the Federation of American Scientists, the first time in 40 years that a nuclear armed plane had been allowed to fly in the U.S (see: http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_9_5.html#149D6ECF ). Since 1968, after a SAC bomber crashed in Greenland, all nuclear armed aircraft have been grounded but were kept on a constant state of alert. After the end of the Cold War, President George H. Bush ordered in 1991 that nuclear weapons were to be removed from all aircraft and stored in nearby facilities.

Recently, the Air Force began decommissioning its stockpile of Advanced Cruise missiles. The five nuclear weapons on the B-52 were to be decommissioned, and were to be taken to another Air Force base. An Air Force press statement issued on September 6 claimed that there “was an error which occurred during a regularly scheduled transfer of weapons between two bases.” Furthermore, the statement declared: “The Air Force maintains the highest standards of safety and precision so any deviation from these well established munitions procedures is considered very serious.” The issue concerning how a nuclear armed B-52 bomber was allowed to take off and fly in U.S. air space after an ‘error’ in a routine transfer process, is now subject to an official Air Force inquiry which is due to be completed by September 14.

Three key questions emerge over the B-52 incident. First, why did Air Force personnel at Minot AFB not spot the ‘error’ earlier given the elaborate security procedures in place to prevent such mistakes from occurring? Many military analysts have commented on the stringent security procedures in place to prevent this sort of mistake from occurring. Multiple officers are routinely involved in the transportation and loading of nuclear weapons to prevent the kind of ‘error’ that allegedly occurred in the B-52 incident. According to the Air Force statement, the commanding officer in charge of military munitions personnel and additional munitions airmen were relieved of duties pending the completion of the investigation. According to Kristensen, the error could not have come from confusing the Advanced Cruise Missile with a conventional weapons since no conventional form exists. So the munitions Airmen should have been easily able to spot the mistake. Other routine procedures were violated which suggests a rather obvious explanation for the error. The military munitions personnel were acting under direct orders, though not through the regular chain of military command. This takes me to the second question

Who was in Charge of the B-52 Incident?

Who ordered the loading of Advanced Cruise missiles on to a B-52 in violation of Air Force regulations? The quick reaction of the Air Force and the issuing of a public statement describing the seriousness of the issue and the launch of an immediate investigation, suggests that whatever occurred, was outside the regular chain of military command. If the regular chain of command was violated, then we have to inquire as to whether the B-52 incident was part of a covert project whose classification level exceeded that held by officers in charge of nuclear weapons at Minot AFB. The most obvious governmental entity that may have ordered the nuclear arming of the B-52 outside the regular chain of military command is the last remaining bastion of neo-conservative activism in the Bush administration.

Vice President Cheney has taken a very prominent role in covert military operations and training exercises designed for the “seamless integration” of different national security and military authorities to possible terrorist attacks. On May 8, 2001, President Bush placed Cheney in charge of "[A]ll federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction, consequence management within the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal agencies" (see: http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/...ify_case.shtml) . Cheney subsequently played a direct role in supervising training exercises that simultaneously occurred during the 911 attacks.

According to former Los Angeles Police Officer Michael Ruppert, Cheney had a parallel chain of command that he used to override Air Force objections to stand down orders that grounded the USAF during the 911 attacks (see: http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/...lify_case.shtml ). Ruppert learned that the Secret Service had the authority to directly communicate presidential and vice presidential orders to fighter pilots in the air thereby circumventing the normal chain of command. (Crossing the Rubicon, pp. 428 – 429). Furthermore: “It is the Secret Service who has the legal mandate to take supreme command in case of a scheduled major event - or an unplanned major emergency - on American soil; these are designated "National Special Security Events".” http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/...lify_case.shtml .

Ruppert and others have subsequently claimed that 911 was an “inside job;” and Cheney through the Secret Service, played a direct leadership role in what occurred over 911. Consequently, it is very possible that Cheney played a similar role in circumventing the regular chain of military command in ordering the B-52 incident. It is likely that the B-52 incident was part of a contrived "National Special Security Event" directly controlled by Cheney by virtue of the authority granted to him by President Bush, and through the Secret Service which has the technological means to by pass the regular chain of military command. I now move to my third key question.

Why was the nuclear armed B-52 sent to Barksdale AFB?

If initial reports that the weapons were being decommissioned, but were mistakenly transported by a B-52 bomber, then the weapons should have been taken to Kirtland Air Force Base. According to Kristensen, this is “where the warheads are separated from the rest of the weapon and shipped to the Energy Department’s Pantex dismantlement facility near Amarillo, Texas” (see: http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_9_5.html#149D6ECF ). However, it has been revealed that Barksdale AFB is used as a staging base for operations in the Middle East (see: http://tpmcafe.com/blog/coffeehouse/2007/s...g_nuke_for_iran ). This is circumstantial evidence that the weapons were being deployed for possible use in the Middle East.

There has been recent speculation concerning a possible attack against Iran given reports that the Pentagon has completed plans for a three day bombing blitz of Iran according to a Sunday Times report (see: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/worl...icle2369001.ece ). The Report claims that 1200 targets have been selected and this will destroy much of Iran’s military infrastructure. Such an attack will devastate Iran’s economy, create greater political instability in the region, and stop the oil supply. A disruption of the oil supply from the Persian Gulf could trigger a global economic recession and lead to the collapse of financial markets. In a synchronistic development, there have been reports of billion dollar investments in high risk stock options in both Europe and the U.S. that would only be profitable if a dramatic collapse of the stock market were to occur before September 21. Similar stock options were purchased weeks before the 911 attack in 2001, and investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission for possible insider trading. The combination of the Sunday Times report and the Stock market option purchases is circumstantial evidence that plans for a concerted military attack against Iran have been secretly approved and covert operations have begun (see: http://exopolitics.org/Exo-Comment-57.htm ).

Seymour Hersh in May 2006 reported the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the use of nuclear weapons against Iran.

In late April, the military leadership, headed by General Pace, achieved a major victory when the White House dropped its insistence that the plan for a bombing campaign include the possible use of a nuclear device to destroy Iran's uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz, nearly two hundred miles south of Tehran. …. "Bush and Cheney were dead serious about the nuclear planning," the former senior intelligence official told me. "And Pace stood up to them. Then the world came back: 'O.K., the nuclear option is politically unacceptable.' http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/07/10/060710fa_fact .

Given earlier opposition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is likely that the present attack plans for Iraq drawn up by the Pentagon don’t involve the use of nuclear weapons. In order to circumvent the regular chain of command, opposed to a nuclear attack, it is very likely that Vice President Cheney contrived a “National Special Security Event” that involved a nuclear armed B-52. This would have given him the legal authority to place orders directly through the Secret Service to the Air Force officers responsible for the B-52 incident.

Conclusion: Exposing those Responsible for the B-52 Incident

Consequently, there is considerable circumstantial evidence to argue that the nuclear armed B-52 was part of a covert operation, outside the regular chain of military command. The most plausible authority responsible for this was Vice President Cheney. He very likely used the Secret Service to take charge of a contrived National Special Security Event involving a nuclear armed B-52 that would be flown from Minot AFB. The B-52 was directed to Barksdale Air Force base where it would have conducted a covert mission to the Middle East involving the detonation of one or more nuclear weapons most likely in or in the vicinity of Iran. This could either have occurred during a conventional military strike against Iran, or a False Flag operation in the Persian Gulf region.

The leaking and discovery of the nuclear armed B-52 at Barksdale was not part of the script. According to a confidential source of Larry Johnson, a former counter-terrorism official from the State Department and CIA, the discovery of the nuclear armed B-52 was leaked. Johnson concludes: “Did someone at Barksdale try to indirectly warn the American people that the Bush Administration is staging nukes for Iran? I don’t know, but it is a question worth asking.”
http://tpmcafe.com/blog/coffeehouse/2007/s...g_nuke_for_iran

While the general public is likely to be given a watered down declassified report by the Air Force over the B-52 incident on September 14, the real investigation will reveal that it was part of a covert operation that intended to bypass the regular chain of command in using nuclear weapons in the Middle East. This will likely result in a furious backlash by key figures in the regular military chain of Command such as Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, and the Commander of Central Command, Admiral William Fallon, who have direct responsibility for the conduct of military operations in the Middle East. The US. Air Force, the Secretary of Defense and Commander of Central Command, is now aware of what was likely going to be the true use of the B-52 and the responsibility of the Office of the Vice President. It is very likely that the exposure of the B-52 incident will lead to an indefinite hold on plans to attack Iran given uncertainty whether other nuclear weapons have been covertly positioned for use in the Middle East. Significantly, public officials briefed about the true circumstances of the B-52 incident will almost certainly place enormous pressure on Vice President Cheney to immediately resign if it is found that he played the role identified above. It is therefore anticipated that in a very short time, the public will learn that Cheney has resigned for health resigns.

The forthcoming September 14 Air Force report will likely describe the B-52 incident as an “error” and an “isolated incident” as foreshadowed in the September 6 Press Statement. This will create some difficulty in exposing the actual role played by Cheney and any other government figures that supported him. There will be a need for continued public awareness of the true events behind the B-52 incident in order to expose the actual role of Cheney. Only in that way can Cheney be held accountable for his actions, and other government figures that supported his neo-conservative agenda be exposed. Regardless of whether Cheney’s role as the prime architect of the B-52 incident is exposed to the public, the official backlash against his covert operation should force his resignation. In either case, a very dangerous public official would be removed from a powerful position of influence. More importantly, the world has been spared a devastating nuclear war by courageous American airmen who revealed the true contents of an otherwise routine B-52 landing at Barksdale, AFB headed for a covert nuclear mission to the Middle East.

Further Reading

Michael Kane, “Simplifying the case against Dick Cheney,” http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/...lify_case.shtml

Larry Johnson, “Staging Nuke for Iran?” http://tpmcafe.com/blog/coffeehouse/2007/s...g_nuke_for_iran

Michael Hoffman, “B-52 mistakenly flies with nukes aboard,”

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/09/mari...ar_B52_070904w/

Michael Salla, Ph.D. “Will the U.S. Attack Iran Before September 21? - Are CIA Front Companies Investing $4.5 Billion to Profit from attacking Iran?” http://exopolitics.org/Exo-Comment-57.htm

Edward Thomas, Lt. Col., “U.S. Air Force Statement on B-52 Nuclear Incident at Minot,” http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/united_states/usaf090607.pdf

Michael Ruppert, Crossing the Rubicon (New Society Publishers, 2004).

Greg Webb, “US Bomber Mistakenly Flies with Nuclear Weapons”

http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_9_5.html#149D6ECF

Authors Website: www.exopolitics.org

Authors Bio: Dr. Michael Salla is an internationally recognized scholar in international politics, conflict resolution, US foreign policy and the new field of 'exopolitics'. He is author/editor of five books; and held academic appointments in the School of International Service& the Center for Global Peace, American University, Washington DC (1996-2004); the Department of Political Science, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia (1994-96); and the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington D.C., (2002). He has a Ph.D in Government from the University of Queensland, Australia, and an M.A. in Philosophy from the University of Melbourne, Australia. He has conducted research and fieldwork in the ethnic conflicts in East Timor, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Sri Lanka, and organized peacemaking initiatives involving mid to high level participants from these conflicts.

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