Identity Of CIA Officer Responsible For Pre-9/11 Failures, Tora Bora Escape, Rendition To Torture Revealed

The name of the CIA officer who ran Alec Station, the agency’s bin Laden unit, in the run-up to 9/11 can be revealed. Known by a variety of aliases in the media until now, such as “Rich” in Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars, “Richard” in the 9/11 Commission report and “Rich B” in George Tenet’s At the Center of the Storm, his real name is Richard Blee.

Blee was a key figure in the pre-9/11 intelligence failures, the CIA station chief in Afghanistan when Osama bin Laden escaped from Tora Bora and instrumental in setting up the Bush administration’s rendition and torture policies.

I confirmed Blee’s identity in this document, notes drafted by a 9/11 Commission staffer, apparently in preparation of the drafting of the final report. The notes were found along with thousands of other 9/11 Commission files at the National Archives by History Commons contributor Erik Larson, who uploaded them to the 9/11 Document Archive at Scribd. I previously blogged other interesting aspects of the notes here and here.

Blee is mentioned several times in the 9/11 Commission’s files, but his name is always redacted, as it has been in the media until now. However, in one case the people doing the redactions let it slip past them.

His name is disclosed on page 41 of the notes, where a comment says: “No one anticipated (well a few like Clarke, Black, Blee) what these people would do, or their single-minded determination, or that it would adapt to events and change to be more lethal.”

Clarke is White House counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, who Blee met with to discuss the an impending al-Qaeda attack in the summer of 2001. Black is Cofer Black, the head of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC) and Blee’s boss at the time.

Before this, much information was known about Blee. His first name was given in at least four books and a key break was provided by former CIA Director George Tenet, who disclosed the initial of his surname in his 2007 book. Tenet even has an entry for “B., Rich” in the index and named the book’s eighth chapter after a comment Blee made to him in July 2001 about the location of the next al-Qaeda attack: “They coming here.”

Harper’s journalist Ken Silverstein revealed in a January 2007 article about Blee (under the pseudonym “James”) that he was the son of a well-known former CIA officer. Taken together, this meant that the officer's first name was Richard, his surname began with the letter B and his father had also been a CIA officer--a relatively small group of people.

His father was David Blee, an Office of Strategic Services veteran who was honoured as one of the CIA’s finest fifty employees ever at ceremony on 18 September 1997. Blee came to fame within the agency in the mid-1960s, when he spirited Stalin’s daughter out of India and to the west. However, his main contribution was to sweep away the influence of paranoid counterintelligence chief James Angleton and build a network of spies in the Eastern Bloc. He also rated a mention by the Church Committee.

David Blee died in August 2000. James Risen’s obituary in the New York Times mentions that one of his sons was called Richard.

Involvement in Pre-9/11 Failures

One of the best-known pre-9/11 failures was the failure by the CIA in January 2000 to pass on to the FBI the information that one of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar, had a US visa, and would therefore probably soon arrive in the US. FBI officers detailed to the CIA learned of the information, but one of Blee’s deputies, Tom Wilshire, prevented them from passing on to the bureau.

While it was wrong of Wilshire to keep information from the bureau, it is perhaps not so unusual for the CIA to withhold information from the FBI. However, Blee’s actions at this time are more bizarre.

The CIA had been monitoring a summit of al-Qaeda leaders in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, which began on 5 January. On 8 January three of the summit attendees, Almihdhar, his partner Nawaf Alhazmi and al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash, left for Bangkok, and Alec Station received a cable from the field reporting this. The CIA claims that its officers in Bangkok could not pick up the surveillance at the airport and that the three men were lost. The next day Alec Station sent a high-priority NIACT (night action) cable urging the station in Bangkok to find them.

Although the other summit attendees had also dispersed at the same time as the three men who flew to Bangkok, on 12 January Blee claimed to his bosses that the surveillance in Kuala Lumpur was continuing. The 9/11 Commission, suggested that Blee “may not have known that in fact Almihdhar and his companions had dispersed and the tracking was falling apart.” The interview of Blee received high-level attention on the commission. It was led by the commission’s executive director Philip Zelikow and two team leaders, Kevin Scheid and Barbara Grewe.

It is unclear how Blee could possibly have been unaware of this, as his unit had previously both received and sent at least one cable stating they had left for Bangkok and he would presumably have asked his subordinates for an update in the four days between the hijackers’ departure from Kuala Lumpur and the 12 January briefing. The commission’s formulation—that Blee “may not have known”—also begs the question: Well, did he know or not? If he did, he withheld key information from his bosses during the high threat period of the millennium alert. If he did not know, it means his subordinates withheld the information from him.

The next day, Bangkok station reported that it could not find the three men. Nevertheless, Blee went back to his superiors on 14 January and told them officials were continuing to track the summit’s attendees, who had now dispersed to various countries. Here, the commission’s report is clear, finding, “there is no evidence of any tracking efforts actually being undertaken by anyone after the Arabs disappeared into Bangkok.”

It is clear the information received by Blee’s superiors was incorrect. Given the improbability of Blee’s subordinates wanting or being able to conceal the real state of affairs from him for nearly a week, it appears that it was Blee that decided to withhold the information from them.

There has been speculation that the reason the information was withheld was to enable the CIA, perhaps using a group of former employees or confederates, to monitor Almihdhar and Alhazmi in the US without having to worry about a competing FBI surveillance team. The above analysis indicates that Blee wanted not only the FBI, but also his own superiors off his back.

The hypothesis that the withholding of the information from the bureau was not sanctioned by the CIA’s management is supported by the behaviour of the agency’s station in Kuala Lumpur. Four local stations performed badly regarding information about Almihdhar in the run-up to 9/11: Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Sana’a and Islamabad. Whereas the performance of the three last-named stations is so shocking—at various times they withheld information they must have known was crucial—that it indicates they were acting in bad faith, the errors by Kuala Lumpur station could be attributed to the usual mistakes that creep into anyone’s performance. In addition, on three separate occasions Kuala Lumpur went the extra mile and tried to move the issue forward. If the withholding of the information from the bureau was approved by the CTC's leadership, why was Kuala Lumpur not on board with this?

“They’re Coming Here”

As most of the heavy lifting in the efforts to keep information about Almihdhar and Alhazmi from the FBI was done by Wilshire, Blee does not resurface in the story until July 2001.

On 4 July, Almihdhar re-entered the US. The next day, Wilshire, who had by then gone on loan to the FBI, apparently as the deputy chief of its International Terrorism Operations Section, wrote an alarming e-mail. In it he told unnamed Alec Station managers that he thought Almihdhar was linked to the current high level of threat reporting.

Five days after the e-mail, Black briefed Tenet about current threat reporting. The briefing was so alarming that it “literally made my hair stand on end,” Tenet recalled. He then immediately took Blee and Black to the White House, requesting an emergency meeting with National Security Condoleezza Rice so that Blee could brief her on the threat reporting. The meeting was also attended by Clarke and Rice’s deputy Stephen Hadley, and caused controversy when it was omitted from the 9/11 Commission’s final report, but highlighted in one of Bob Woodward’s books.

There is no indication that Blee mentioned Almihdhar or Malaysia to anybody there, at this time or at any other.

The withholding of the information about Almihdhar in January 2000 and subsequent occasions only makes sense if the hijackers were being followed by people linked to those who were withholding the information, and Blee sits at the centre of that web. It is therefore highly likely that Blee knew all about the hijackers’ entries and residences in the US by this time from following Almihdhar and Alhazmi, but that he withheld this information deliberately. Had he told the people at the meeting of this information, there would have been plenty of time to prevent the attacks—over two months to round the hijackers up.

Three days after the meeting, Wilshire sent another e-mail to the Counterterrorist Center, this time warning that Khallad was a “major-league killer,” pointing out that he had been identified by a CIA mole in al-Qaeda, and saying that it would be a good time to re-examine the Malaysia summit documents to get more information about him. On the same day this e-mail was sent Blee wrote an e-mail to another CIA officer entitled “Identification of Khallad,” so it is highly likely Blee received this e-mail.

Wilshire wrote a third e-mail on 23 July. This time it was very clear:

When the next big op is carried out by [bin Laden’s] hardcore cadre, [Khallad bin Attash] will be at or near the top of the command food chain—and probably nowhere near either the attack site or Afghanistan. That makes people who are available and who have direct access to him of very high interest. Khalid Almihdhar should be very high interest anyway, given his connection to the [redacted].

Blee made the comment that left such an impression on Tenet around this time. Tenet wrote:

[I]magine how I and everyone else in the room reacted during one of my updates in late July when, as we speculated about the kind of attacks we could face, Rich B. suddenly said, with complete conviction, “They’re coming here.” I’ll never forget the silence that followed.

At this time, Blee certainly had reason to make such a comment: he was the government official most responsible for gathering the warning signs in the summer of threat and thus the most highly aware of them. He must have been aware of the hijackers’ presence in the US and was also involved in efforts to keep this presence hidden from both the bureau and his own superiors. Even if he did not figure out that the hijackers were linked to the threat reporting by himself, he must have known this because Wilshire told him so repeatedly and documented this with a clear paper trail.

Even if we suppose that Blee was cut off from the surveillance of the hijackers, Alec Station claims to have realised Almihdhar and Alhazmi were in the US on August 21 and communicated this to the FBI. (Coincidentally, this was one day before Blee’s nemesis FBI manager John O’Neill retired from the bureau and Ali Soufan, a bureau agent who had been asking questions about a possible al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia, went back to Yemen.) At this point Alec Station knew (1) there was going to be a major al-Qaeda attack, (2) Almihdhar was one of the terrorists probably involved in the attack, and (3) Almihdhar was in the US. With this information, it does not take a genius to work out the likely location of the attack was inside the US. Yet the FBI’s search for Almihdhar, overseen by Wilshire, was a catastrophe.

The case against Blee can be summed up like this: some intelligence community employees at and linked to Alec Station deliberately withheld information from the FBI in general and the USS Cole investigators in particular about Almihdhar and Alhazmi. Two of the officials who were involved in one example of this in January 2000, Doug Miller and Mark Rossini, have confessed to their part and implicated Wilshire and one of his subordinates. It stretches credulity well beyond breaking point to suggest that the group centred on Blee and Wilshire withheld information deliberately in January 2000, but that its subsequent inability to pass on the same and similar information was due to overwork and understaffing, especially given the most peculiar circumstances in which the information was not passed.

Although it is Wilshire that did most of the work, it is hard to imagine that a deputy unit chief could practice such a deception, leading us to suspect his boss, Blee. This suspicion is greatly enhanced by Blee’s incorrect briefings of his superiors on 12 and 14 January 2000 and his failure to mention to anyone the evident links between the high threat and the Malaysia meeting in numerous discussions in the summer of 2001. In addition, his position as a child of a CIA hero would have given him access to a network of intelligence community professionals. If he did want “off-the-books” surveillance of the two hijackers in San Diego, he would have known who to call.

It is certainly possible to dream up scenarios in which the surveillance of the hijackers inside the US somehow broke down, or to theorise that the hijackers, who were employing a countersurveillance technique when taking flights, were smarter than the people monitoring them. Both these scenarios would clear Blee of the most serious charge of deliberately allowing the attacks. However, neither of these scenarios seem likely at the moment. Perhaps further research will allow them to be either confirmed or ruled out.

Another question to ask is: did Blee benefit from the attacks?

Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars offers us an insight into the debate inside the CIA about what action to take against Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. It portrays Blee as an officer most interested in providing increased assistance to Northern Alliance chief Ahmed Shah Massoud, with whom he met repeatedly. However, Blee was frustrated in this by others at the White House and agency, who did not trust Massoud. As we now know, all this changed after 9/11 and the US is still bogged down there along with its allies. In addition, as we will see, it was Blee that got himself appointed head of the CIA arm of the war…

What Richard Blee Did Next

Following the attacks, Blee was made station chief in Kabul, replacing Gary Berntsen, an officer who had realised the back door was open for bin Laden to escape from the battle of Tora Bora. Knowing some of the local warlords could not be trusted, Berntsen had repeatedly requested US ground forces to close off the escape routes and encircle bin Laden. However, he was unsuccessful, and Blee arrived to take over on 9 December. Although there are numerous stories about bin Laden’s escape from Tora Bora, he seems to have still been there at this time. For example, in The One Percent Doctrine author Ron Suskind has bin Laden making at radio broadcast there Bora on 15 December.

Had bin Laden been captured or killed there, it certainly would have provided some degree of closure for the US and the world, and probably significantly changed the course of subsequent events, possibly including a swift withdrawal from Afghanistan and a different public perception of the security vs. liberty trade-off. One can speculate about Blee’s role, but there is no evidence, let alone proof, one way or the other. On the other hand, it would be interesting to read his first cables from Afghanistan and compare them to Berntsen’s.

As CIA station chief in Afghanistan, he must have overseen all the abuses of prisoners that occurred there. One example for them all, from the Washington Post:

In November 2002, a newly minted CIA case officer in charge of a secret prison just north of Kabul allegedly ordered guards to strip naked an uncooperative young Afghan detainee, chain him to the concrete floor and leave him there overnight without blankets, according to four U.S. government officials aware of the case.

The Afghan guards -- paid by the CIA and working under CIA supervision in an abandoned warehouse code-named the Salt Pit -- dragged their captive around on the concrete floor, bruising and scraping his skin, before putting him in his cell, two of the officials said.

As night fell, so, predictably, did the temperature.

By morning, the Afghan man had frozen to death.

While Tora Bora is shrouded in the fog of war, the rendition of Ibn Shaikh al-Libi is not. Al-Libi, who had run training camps for radicals in Afghanistan, was captured by Pakistani forces trying to flee the country in November and handed over to the US in December. His questioning was initially headed by FBI agent Russell Fincher, who used the bureau’s traditional rapport-building techniques and began to extract nuggets of information from al-Libi. Fincher had previously worked on the Cole investigation--he was one of the agents the Blee/Wilshire group had withheld information about Almihdhar and Alhazmi from before 9/11.

FBI veteran Jack Cloonan was working with Fincher from headquarters. He later told the American Prospect: “They're getting good stuff, and everyone's getting the raw 302s [interview summaries] -- the agency, the military, the director. But for some reason, the CIA chief of station in Kabul is taking issue with our approach.”

Newsweek also fingered Blee as the official responsible for starting the interagency contest:

The CIA station chief in Afghanistan, meanwhile, appealed to the agency's hawkish counterterrorism chief, Cofer Black. He in turn called CIA Director George Tenet, who went to the White House. Al-Libi was handed over to the CIA.

More details of the discussions over al-Libi between the CIA, FBI and White House can be found elsewhere. However, this was the key battle between the agency and the bureau over the handling of detainees and determined the outcome of later contests, in particular the fight over Abu Zubaida. The CIA’s victory led to the “enhanced interrogation techniques” and everything they gave rise to.

After the agency took control of al-Libi, they put him on a plane to Cairo, where he was tortured into confessing a fictitious link between al-Qaeda and Iraq. This information then found its way into Colin Powell’s famous speech to the UN making the case for war with Iraq.

Ali Soufan, one of the Cole investigators from whom the Blee/Wilshire group had withheld information before 9/11, interviewed Abu Zubaida after his capture and got some useful information out of him. However, the CIA, led by its SERE contractors, muscled in on the interrogation and started implementing its torture tactics. Soufan was disgusted and protested what was happening, but eventually left the site of the interrogation.

Before 9/11, one of the mechanisms used to justify withholding the information was the “wall,” a term sometimes used to mean different things, but basically a set of regulations governing information sharing between and inside agencies. After 9/11, the wall came down, and information was shared freely in the panic to prevent what was then assumed to be the next attack. However, as Soufan wrote in an April 2009 New York Times op-ed:

One of the worst consequences of the use of these harsh techniques was that it reintroduced the so-called Chinese wall between the C.I.A. and F.B.I., similar to the communications obstacles that prevented us from working together to stop the 9/11 attacks. Because the bureau would not employ these problematic techniques, our agents who knew the most about the terrorists could have no part in the investigation. An F.B.I. colleague of mine who knew more about Khalid Shaikh Mohammed than anyone in the government was not allowed to speak to him.

Blee, whose subordinates built up an impressive track record of failing to share information with the FBI before the attacks, helped re-institute the barriers that enabled the information to be withheld after them. In particular, this led to information not being obtained by Fincher and Soufan, two of the very agents he and his associates had been withholding information from not six months previously. We must ask: is this just a coincidence? Or could Blee reasonably foresee that shipping al-Libi to Egypt and getting control of detainees for the CIA would hurt the FBI’s access to information?

Finally, there is the question of the CIA’s assassination programme, devised but never implemented after 9/11, although it was put into practice by the military in another form.

The first mention of it in the press I can find is in Dana Priest’s groundbreaking November 2005 exposé of the CIA’s black sites, “The CTC's chief of operations argued for creating hit teams of case officers and CIA paramilitaries that would covertly infiltrate countries in the Middle East, Africa and even Europe to assassinate people on the list [of high-value targets], one by one.”

Although Blee was appointed chief of Alec Station around June 1999, there was a reorganisation at the Counterterrorist Center in the first half of the next year and Blee’s position was upgraded. In a 2007 article Silverstein gives his positions in chronological order: a posting to Algeria (which was in the early 90s), work on Iraq (mid-90s), chief of operations at the CTC with oversight of Alec Station and renditions, and station chief in Kabul (a position he took up in December 2001). Therefore it appears that after his short stint as Alec Station chief, the position he moved to was CTC chief of operations. This makes him the official Priest has arguing “for creating hit teams.”

As we can see, he built up a very consistent track record: withholding information before 9/11, assassination teams, rendition and torture. Thankfully, it seems he has now left the agency.

Originally posted here.

To Kevin Fenton


While you were focused on finding this identity, which up to now has been a complete secret, I was more focused on why the FBI shut down their own investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi. I have new information you may not be aware of:

Were you aware that FBI Agent Steve Bongardt, Soufan's assistant on the Cole bombing investigation, never knew that when FBI Agent Dina Corsi told him the he had to shut down his investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi on August 28, 2001, they she knew that the CIA had been hiding the photograph and identification of Khallad Bin Attash from this photograph from him and his team. This photograph directly connected Mihdhar and Hazmi to the planning of the Cole bombing, and to a crime, and meant this investigation of these al Qaeda terrorists should have gone to Bongardt and his team. Bongardt in fact was never given this information by the FBI, even after many years after the attacks on 9/11.

Were you aware that Steve Bongardt never knew that when FBI Agent Margaret Gillespie found that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US and took that information to CIA officer Tom Wilshire and FBI Agent Dina Corsi, Wilshire knew that these terrorists were inside of the US in order to take part in a horrific al Qaeda attack that would kill thousands of Americans. Corsi had to be aware of this information also.

Were you aware that FBI Agent Steve Bongardt never knew that when his boss, FBI Agent Ali Soufan, asked FBI Director Louis Freeh if the he would make an official request in November 2000 to George Tenet and the CIA for any information that the CIA had on any al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000, or on Khallad Bin Attash, and was told that there was no information on this at the CIA, that Freeh himself had been given this information by both the CIA and NSA. This information with the full name Khalid al-Mihdhar also appeared in FBI Director Louis Freeh’s January 4, 2000 daily briefing papers.

At this time the CIA must have known that Khallad had also been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting since they had Soufan’s passport photo of Khallad and the Kuala Lumpur photo of Khallad at the same time. Neither Bongardt or Soufan ever knew that Freeh had criminally obstructed their investigation of the USS Cole bombing, and had hidden information from them that would have prevented that attacks on 9/11.

Were you aware that Bongardt never knew why the CIA had called for the meeting with him and his team in New York FBI office on June 11, 2001, and never found out that this had been a string on him and his group by the CIA to see if these FBI investigators had found out about the meeting in Kuala Lumpur and the fact that Khallad, Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at that meeting planning the Cole bombing. I even found the iron clad proof that both CIA Bin Laden deputy chief Tom Wilshire and CIA Bin Laden unit officer Clark Shannon had Soufan’s April 2001 request for information from the CIA, and instead of giving Soufan this information they set up this meeting in New York FBI field office only to see what the FBI Cole investigators had found out about this al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur. No other investigation of 9/11 has ever uncovered this horrific fact that is clear proof of a massive criminal conspiracy at both the CIA and FBI HQ to obstruct the Cole bombing investigation.

Since this meeting is a now a well documented crime, it is strange no one has been criminally indicted for this crime and not conceivable that the 9/11 Commission did not uncover the obvious information that points to this enormous crime that ultimately had allowed the attacks on 9/11 to take place.

One small detail, you wrote that: “Even if we suppose that Blee was cut off from the surveillance of the hijackers, Alec Station claims to have realized Almihdhar and Alhazmi were in the US on August 21 and communicated this to the FBI.” Corsi and Wilshire were both part of this huge criminal conspiracy, so on August 22, 2001 when this information was given to FBI Agent Corsi, but both Corsi and Wilshire worked together to shut down FBI Agent Steve Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi.

Footnote #44

A new film Kyle is working on based on footnote #44 in Chapter 6 of the 9-11
Commission Report.
Seite 519 des 9/11 C/R

A press release from the September 11th Advocates reads in part:

"In July 2004, when the 9/11 Commission released its Final Report, we read with enormous interest, Chapter 6 - "From Threat to Threat", including footnote #44. Footnote #44 details an instance where a CIA desk officer intentionally withheld vital information from the FBI about two of the 9/11 hijackers who were inside the United States. This footnote further states that the CIA desk officer covered-up the decision to withhold said vital information from the FBI. Finally, footnote #44 states that the CIA desk officer could not recall who told her to carry out such acts."

So this Richard Blee was somehow involved in burying the real information (surnames) about Al-Midhar and Az-Hazmi in briefing the FBI?

Reply to Footnote #44

Numerous times and in fact was one of the CIA managers that who had prevented CIA officer Tom Wilshire twice in July 2001 from giving the information on Mihdhar and Hazmi to the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing.

After this on August 22, 2001 when FBI IOS Agent found Mihdhar and Hazmi inside of the US, and took this information to Wilshire and FBI IOS agent Dina Corsi, they not only kept this information secret from FBI Agent Steve Bongardt, who was leading the Cole bombing investigation in the New York office, but then shut down Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi when he accidently found out these al Qaeda terrorists were inside of the US.

The FBI HQ and CIA had to know when they were shutting down Bongardt’s investigation that thousands of Americans were then going to perish in the al Qaeda attacks they knew were just about to take place.

thanks Kevin, and question for rschop

Kevin- great 'alternative' resume for Blee- this guy needs to be put under oath and questioned by experienced interrogators w/o conflicts of interest (would be good if you're one of them, or have input on the lines of questioning)

rschop: how do you know the details in your first comment; what are your sources?

reply to loose nuke

DOJ IG report detailed that on August 22, 2001, Corsi tells an agent at New York FBI field office that the CIA is sending over the photos of Mihdhar and Hazmi, which they did on August 23, 2001 and has the photograph of Khallad taken at the Kuala Lumpur meeting. See my summary in for the exact page number in the DOJ IG report.

Incredibly the CIA sends the photograph of Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur to Rod Middleton on August 30, 2001. So Corsi's boss now knows that Khallad, Mihdhar and Hazmi were together in Kuala Lumpur planning the Cole bombing and has photographic proof of this. Corsi had known this well before the June 11, 201 meeting between the FBI HQ, CIA and FBI Cole investigators, so I assume Middleton knew this, but at this point he has the proof of this. Incredibly Middleton and Corsi had a phone conversation with Bongardt on August 28, 2001 explaining to him why he was not allowed to start any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi.

He was told he was not allowed to have this information that the CIA and FBH HQ had because it came from the NSA and there were restrictions on giving NSA information to FBI criminal investigators. But Corsi had gotten a written release from the NSA the day before to give this NSA information to Bongardt and his team from the NSA, see DE 448 on the web site Since Middleton had been on the phone with Bongardt on August 28, 2001, he is now aware on August 30, 2001 that Mihdhar and Hazmi had taken part in the crime of planning the Cole bombing and knows his advice of August 28, 2001 is bogus, and that Bongardt should be able to use any means necessary to investigate and find Mihdhar and Hazmi in time to head off this massive al Qaeda attack he is aware of. But he never did undo his crimes of criminally obstructing Bongardt’s investigation, so it is clear Middleton is more heavily involved in this massive criminal conspiracy than previously thought. Almost 3000 people are going to die on 9/11 because of this criminal conspiracy to hide this information from the FBI criminal investigators.

The Kuala Lumpur photograph of Khallad is the photograph that the CIA had been trying to keep away from FBI Agent Steve Bongardt and his team of Cole investigators. Had Bongardt gotten this photograph, since he knew that Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting on August 28, 2001, he would have immediately known that the CIA and FBI HQ had criminally obstructed his investigation of the Cole bombing at the June 11, 2001 meeting in New York.

At that meeting Bongardt had asked who are these people in these photos, the three photos of Mihdhar and Hazmi Wilshire had gotten from the CIA, and was told that the CIA and FBI HQ, FBI Agent Dina Corsi and CIA officer Clarke Shannon, could not give him this information due to the wall. But the commission of a crime would have nullified any concept of “the wall”, and everyone knew it. As long as the CIA and FBI HQ could keep this photograph of Khallad a secret Bongardt would be unable to start any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, and when he did accidently find out, and wanted to start on investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, the FBI HQ was able to shut down his investigation since he had no way to link Mihdhar and Hazmi to the mastermind of the Cole bombing and the planning of this attack at Kuala Lumpur.

If Corsi, Wilshire, and Shannon knew that Khallad had been at that Kuala Lumpur meeting actually planning the Cole bombing, and withheld this material information from an ongoing FBI criminal investigation into the death of 17 American sailors, they would have committed a crime. But they all did know, they admitted this to the FBI criminal investigators taking testimony for the DOJ IG investigation into the performance of the FBI prior to that attack on 9/11. All of this information and connected dots have been hidden by the 9/11 Commission from the American people to hide the crimes at both the CIA and FBI HQ.

What is most horrific is after the CIA and FBI HQ found out that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US, and knew from the July 23, 2001 Wilshire’s email that Mihdhar was going to take part in the next big al Qaeda attack, they had to know that shutting down Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi would result in the deaths of many thousands of Americans who were going to perish as a result of their actions, in order to keep themselves out of prison.

Interesting take on Middleton

Check this:

Page 52: Middleton recalls finding out Almihdhar was in the US as an "'Oh sh*t' moment" on 23 August. Then he does nothing for five days at which point he makes his major contribution of wrongly telling Bongardt to butt out. Then he has some sort of interaction with Corsi and Sabol, after which his memory appears to have been wiped. I remember previously half-heartedly defending Middleton somewhere, maybe I was being too charitable.

Middleton, his criminal actions in allowing the attacks on 9/11

Way too chartable, it looks like Middleton was in this criminal conspiracy right up to his eye balls. The fact he was on the phone with Corsi shutting down Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar on August 28, 2001 and then getting the photograph of Khallad Bin Attash on August 30, 2001, is damming. He now had photographic proof that Khallad had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting with Mihdhar and Hazmi planning the Cole bombing.

He clearly knows that by August 30, 2001 that shutting down, with Dina Corsi, Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi was a criminal act by criminally obstructing the FBI Cole investigation into the murder of 17 United States sailors on the USS Cole. There is no way anyone can wash this away.

So why did the FBI IG investigators give him a Corsi and Middleton a pass on this horrific crime that lead to the deaths of almost 3000 people.

But it gets worse, yes far worse.

There is DE 792 also available on the Moussaoui web site.

This is the threat about Khattab and Bin Laden that the ITOS unit got in April 2001.

"This is to advise you of recent threat reporting deemed significant and urgent by the United States intelligence Community.

The US Government has received information indicating that serious operational planning has been underway since late 2000, with a intended culmination in late spring 2001…

Mr. Pichard, Mr. Rolince, Mr. Watson, Mr. Middleton

Multiple sources also suggest that UBL’s organization is planning a terrorists attack against UT interests…

ITOS response

The UBL unit, with Rod Middleton as head and Dina Corsi, is preparing an EC for all field offices and Legats, advising of the heightened threat environment Field offices will be requested to utilize all resources, including electronic data bases and human resources, for supplemental information to be reported immediately to FBIHQ.

Dale Watson”

So prior to Rod Middleton shutting down FBI Agent Steve Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, Middleton is the one who had issued an EC describing this threat from Bin Laden’s organization, to be sent throughout the FBI. So when Middleton knew that Khallad had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting with Mihdhar and Hazmi planning the Cole bombing, and knew there was a big attack about to take place, inside of the US with Mihdhar and Hazmi taking part in this attack he had to know his actions in shutting down Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi would result in the deaths of thousands of Americans. he also had to know that he had under taken criminal actions in shutting down Bongrad's investigtaion of Mihdhar and Hazmi.

As I said be before he was involved right up to his eye balls, an involvement you can see from the information that now exists. I think it is strange however that he had been given so little notice by the DOJ IG.

Rschop, thanks

Interesting information.

Our Government and the Press' Failures

Big kudos to Kevin Fenton on an excellent piece of investigative reporting. Richard Earl Blee is obviously one of the handful of America’s shadow government officials who were most likely involved in the 9/11 attacks. Blee provided Almihdhar and Alhazmi the necessary cover to freely operate in America from one of the highest positions at the CIA.

Fenton’s piece also substantiates the extremely poor jobs of the main stream media and the 9/11 Commission. It’s pathetic when this kind of information is discovered and brought to light by a private citizen instead of institutions with million dollar budgets and significant manpower assets. There is no excuse for this level of incompetence relating to such a significant world changing event.

It is also pathetic that not “one” single individual or institution has been held accountable for the dozens of significant failures that led to the 9/11 attacks. Fenton asks some very good and serious questions that need to be asked first hand to Blee and other members of Alec Station, preferably in an investigative court with subpoena and prosecuting powers. This is the democratic principle called ACCOUNTABILITY, which is totally absent in “all” the government’s investigations relating to 9/11.

Fenton and his Alec Station subordinates (as well as Black & Tenet) need to be put on a witness stand for potential crimes committed related to the 9/11 attacks and be asked to clarify these many contradictions and failures (note: remember Tenet knew for nearly 2 weeks about the FBI Moussaoui capture, but appears to forgot to tell the President and others at CIA). Unfortunately, the US government has too much to lose if the real truth behind 9/11 comes out and that’s why there will never be any trials or further investigations relating to the crime of the century.

The US government, including President Obama, has long lost its ability to scorn and belittle the so called 9/11 conspiracies and the people who promote them. Until the US government can show that it is supports true transparency and accountability in all aspects of 9/11, its position of leadership and moral high-ground will always be doubted and mistrusted. Fortunately, there are still people like Kevin Fenton who are keeping the guilty on guard and still seeking the truth behind an event that has changed this country forever.

Fenton on trial?

OMG! ;-)

Sure you meant Blee.

How can one make sure that a prosecutor acts on this information and review thze case?

How can one make sure that a prosecutor acts on this information

I don't think you can, too many people in Washington DC are now invloved.

In fact the fact that the CIA and FBI HQ had intentionally allowed the al Qaeda terrorists to carry out the attacks on 9/11 has to be an open secret in Washibngton DC today.

There were probably less than one hundred people at the CIA and FBI HQ involved in the original criminal conspiracy to hide information from the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing investigation, but now there may be another 50-100 involved in the criminal cover up, including many people on the Joint Inquiry investigation, the 9'/11 Commission investigation and the DOJ IG investigation.

The people involved originally were the CIA Bin Laden unit, the CIA Yemen station, the Pakistan CIA station, possible the Thailand CIA station, the entire hierarchy of the CIA, including Richard Blee, Cofer Black, George Tenet, John Pavitt, and John Gannon, plus the ITOS unit at the FBI with the RFU unit, with Maltbie and Frasca, and the Bin Laden unit, with Corsi, Wilshire, and Middleton, but also Michele Rolince, and the Louis Freeh. I now have unsalable proof that can trace this conspiracy to virtually every one of these people. I did not find any evidence that the CIA Malaysian station was criminally involved in any way, even though the al Qaeda planning meeting at Kuala Lumpur took part in Malaysia.

I can even tell how the reports on 9/11 had been obfuscated to hide the truth in almost all cases, in virtually every case where this was done.

Oddly the CIA IG report is probably the most accurate but this report has never been release beyond a heavily modified executive version.

Obama would have to make the decision that the people who had intentionally allowed the attack on 9/11 to take place should be prosecuted and he has so far ruled that they should not be prosecuted and these people who had allowed the terrorists to kill almost 3000 people on 9/11 face no accountability. See

I have a hard time believing

that all members of the units were in on it.

"The people involved originally were the CIA Bin Laden unit, the CIA Yemen station, the Pakistan CIA station, possible the Thailand CIA station, the entire hierarchy of the CIA, including Richard Blee, Cofer Black, George Tenet, John Pavitt, and John Gannon, plus the ITOS unit at the FBI with the RFU unit, with Maltbie and Frasca, and the Bin Laden unit, with Corsi, Wilshire, and Middleton, but also Michele Rolince, and the Louis Freeh. I now have unsalable proof that can trace this conspiracy to virtually every one of these people."

I know a lot about John O'Neill and Ali Soufan, it's reported that someone from Alec Station once smuggled papers to him that his boss doesn't want to be shared. I suppose it is possible with fewer people to archieve the cover for the patsies/terrorists beforehand. I do believe that the names you presented were somehow involved, but you can get a cover-up acting without knowledge of the plot itself. Please consider this.
The most critical point was the false briefing by "James" during the Malaysian summit. If anyone from the FBI units on the Cole case had been aware of the surnames, the case would have been closed.

Couln't the victims family sue the FBI/CIA persons based on this new information? If so, the 9/11 Timeliners like Thompson and Fenton maybe could make the case!

re:Could the victims family sue the FBI/CIA persons....

Reply to:
Couldn't the victims family sue the FBI/CIA persons based on this new information?

The same thing that has stopped all suites against the CIA and FBI HQ, both of these agencies would claim in court that any information about these events had to remain secret because of issues of national security, and the courts would let them off without even attempting to find out what the issue of national security really was.

It makes no difference if there is a real issue of national security or not, the courts will accept any and all claims of national security from these agencies as valid.

Sort of like having a license to commit numerous crimes with no possible accountability, like allowing the attacks on 9/11 to take place and then getting away with it, even in the face of intense national skepticism that these agencies had actually allowed the terrorists to carry out the attacks on 9/11.

Time line of 9/11

Just saw the time line of 9/11 again on cable. Fox absolutely lambasted Van Jones last Sunday, September 6, 2009, for his signing of the petition for a new investigation when after you see this time line again all you can think about is why did they not get to the bottom of this and find out what really happened that had allowed these attacks to take place

What an unmitigated disgrace for FOX news to close this over and demonize anyone that wants a real look at the facts when there many unanswered questions. All of the FOX panelists on Sunday said it was unforgivable for anyone to ask for any investigation to determine if people in the US government had intentionally allowed the attacks to take place and that this position was indefensible.

The information the web site now has conclusive evidence from the US government’s own documents that clearly show that the attacks on 9/11 were allowed to take place by intentional actions at the CIA and FBI HQ.

If anyone wants the real story to see the light of day that is what they should concentrate on, the actions at the FBI HQ and CIA prior to the attacks on 9/11 that had allowed these attacks to take place. Kevin Fenton has looked this area and has added a lot of very well researched information on why a new investigation is needed.