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Response to Miles Kara´s review of new 9/11 air defense film

On July 7th, 2011 Miles Kara, researcher and former staff member of the 9/11 Commission, wrote a response to my film "Inside 9/11 - Hijacking the air defense":

http://www.oredigger61.org/?page_id=2409

Here is my answer to him - as an open letter.

Dear Miles Kara,

a reader pointed me to your response on my film "Inside 9/11 - Hijacking the air defense". First I want to thank you for taking the time for a closer look on this. I put this as an open letter, going out to several other researchers as well. My principal aim is to promote an open discussion about this issue and your response is a very welcome step in this process.

The difficulty: My film is a very short summary of an 50-page essay, published two weeks ago in my German book "Inside 9/11 - Neue Fakten und Hintergründe zehn Jahre danach" ("Inside 9/11 - New facts and backgrounds ten years after"). I´m really looking for an American or UK publisher, so that my quite detailed research can be fully understood also by English speaking people. The film is more of a trailer in this respect. The arguments go deeper. But nonetheless the most important sources for each single claim are already mentioned in the film, as you surely may have noticed.

Knowing these limitations - here are my remarks on your response in short words.

1. Otis Scramble

My point: the 3-4 minutes delay from around 8:42 till 8:46 is unexplained

Official position: Marr supposedly had to ask General Arnold before he could scramble

Opposite argument: Colin Scoggins, Military Liaison at FAA Boston Center on 9/11, says that´s not true - the call was unnecessary because Marr had the authority to scramble jets on his own

Any comment on this from your side? Because in your remarks you didn´t even mention my point - the issue of the necessity of Marr´s call to Arnold.

2. Langley Scramble

My point: Nasypany wanted to scramble at 9:09, Marr resisted. But the reasons Marr gave for his resistance are appearantly inconsistent.

Official position: outlined in Marr´s interview with the 9/11 Commission, date 23.01.04, as well as in Lynn Spencer´s "Touching History", p. 112. I´m citing here the facts based on these sources from my book "Inside 9/11" (pp. 55-62):

Marr said he resisted the Langley scramble at 9:09 for two reasons: (a) he wanted to avoid that the Otis and the Langley jets ran out of fuel at the same time - leaving the air defense with no usable assets and (b) he didn´t want to have all fighters in one place - because according to Marr the Langley jets were also to fly to New York.

Opposite argument: (a) At 9:09 the Otis jets were already about 16-17 minutes airborne. How should they run out of fuel at the same time as the Langley jets airborne not earlyer than 10 to 15 minutes past 9:09 - in total taking off about half an hour past the Otis jets? (b) Nasypany said something different. According to him the Langley jets were not to fly to New York but to the Baltimore region right from the beginning - as he said to place a "barrier cap" north of Washington. (Interview 9/11 Commission with Nasypany, date 22./23.01.04) That means the Otis and the Langley jets weren´t at all to be in the same place.

Therefore in my opinion Marr´s account is inconsistent and no sufficient explanation is given so far for the delay in scambling the Langley jets.

3. Captain Borgstrom - Langley Supervisor of Flying

My point: Borgstrom was appearantly send away by NEADS leadership, with NEADS personnell in the "Operations Floor" not knowing about it - to the effect that communication with the Langley jets broke down

Official reason: not been given, issue not discussed officially so far
You say the call came not from Marr, but from Major Anderson. Furthermore the whole issue wouldn´t matter at all.

Opposite argument: If I get it right (please correct me if not), than Anderson sat in the NEADS "Operations Floor" right behind Sergeant Jeremy Powell. But according to Lynn Spencer´s account ("Touching History", p. 148) Powell didn´t know anything of this call. As he phoned Langley to give instructions to the airborne pilots he learned to his big surprise that the Supervisor of Flying Captain Borgstrom had been ordered to take off as a third pilot. How should that be, if Powell and Anderson sat right next to each other? Furthermore: Spencer indicates, that the call came clearly from Marr´s "Battle Cab". ("Touching History", p. 148)

More important: why sending a third pilot at all? What should have been the benefit of this? It´s obvious that in the end this decision led to communication breakdown with the Langley pilots.

All you do is citing the 9/11 Commission Report on this, which explains next to nothing regarding the question of Borgstrom.

4. Shootdown Order

My point: Colonel Marr didn´t convey Cheney´s Shootdown Order to the pilots

Official reason: not been given, issue not discussed officially so far

Although this has been put into question already by more prominent people than me: (a) John Farmer, leader of the 9/11 Commission´s Team 8, for whom you worked and who asks noteworthy questions about Marr´s behaviour regarding this in his book "The Ground Truth", p. 261. (b) Timothy Roemer of the 9/11 Commission (12th Public Hearing, Transcript, pp. 61-62)

Basically you say, the issue would´t matter because at the time the order was given the attacks were already over. But the crucial question is indeed: when was the order actually given?

Cheney´s position on this: he reached the bunker at 9:58, giving the order only after the crash of Flight 93. But there´s strong evidence against this. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta witnessed Cheney was in the bunker even before 9:20 - some 40 minutes earlyer as stated by the Vice President. Mineta´s recollection on this is corroborated precisely by radar data of Flight 77. (National Transportation Safety Board, 19.02.02, „Flight Path Study - American Airlines Flight 77“)

It appears that the exact timing of Cheney´s Shootdown Order is in great dispute. Evidence suggests, the order might have been given much earlier than officially stated.

That´s why Marr´s decision not to convey the order would possibly also have been made much earlier. I think this dispute about Cheney alone would require a new public investigation of 9/11 - because of its significance which one can hardly overestimate. And I think you possibly know this.

5. Syracuse fighters

On this I could possibly go along with your judgement - at least in some respect. But context does matter too. And as you see, I think to have found one man delaying and obstructing over and over again. And the case of Syracuse simply fits into this pattern - even though it might really not be that important as the first four examples.

Summation

You summarize my film: "His thesis and argument are false and do not provide the support he intended." Sorry, but that same judgement one could also give about your argument which doesn´t convince at all.

What I really don´t understand: Why are you against a new public investigation? I think everybody could win with it. If the serious charges by some critics, such as mine, where really investigated in a transparent way ... who knows ... in the end it might emerge they´re all wrong ... Couldn´t it be? What would reasonable people like you loose with this?

Best regards,

Paul Schreyer

Discussion

point 1
Could it be, that the response of a hijacking would have had to be coordinated by the "hijack-coordinator" and the NMCC and not by Scoggins and Marr?

point 2
Are you sure, that you can interpret Major Nasypany statement in that way, that he wanted to scramble around 09:09?
For my understanding, he put the langley fighters on "battle station" at this time, to scramble them as a barrier cab, if there would have been another hijacking. I am not sure, perhabs a "mother-speaker" can read it.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/20965380/Mfr-Nara-t8-neads-Nasypany-Kevin-J-12204-00771

point 3
I am in accordance with you

point 4
it makes no sense, that Cheney gave a shot-down order and the young man updated him about Flight 77 rushing to the pentagon, and asked him shorty before its crash, weather "the orders still stand" (which Cheney affirms) and then ... happens nothing, the plane crashed unhindered into the pentagon.

There are many more questions regarding your book. It is nevertheless my above discussion good and helping.

Emergency vs. Hijacking

On point 1, the Hijacking Protocol contemplated a very specific type of situation, which should not have overridden the judgment of ground controllers that the flight[s] were experiencing an in-flight emergency—most severely by going way off course, but also extended loss of radio contact and transponder signal—which would call for a much faster response irrespective of whether the cause was a hijacking.

The point becomes almost academic when we recall that Scoggins went in both directions simultaneously. That was probably sound: If the situation stabilized—radio contact restored, transponder back on, and flight path corrected, there would still be a hijacking and it were best if those channels had already been opened for the appropriate response. But if Flight 11 had continued meandering through American air space, presenting a potential and expedient danger to other air traffic, the Emergency Protocol was the right call.

And Scoggins had that authority, as he demonstrated to his DOJ interrogators— he had a letter of agreement with NEADS on that point.

But this is the point that the Zelikow Commission seems to have tried hard to obfuscate, not even mentioning the Emergency Protocol—which was technically NOT set aside by that June 1 memo.

For anyone who questions whether the Emergency Protocol was still in effect, I have but one question which has never been answered: Then how do you explain the Langley scramble at 09:24? That was done exactly the way it should have been, only the Hi-Perps evidently used other means to sabotage that one.

more discussion

According to Schreyers book, the phone call of Marr to Arnold to seek permission for the scramble was unnecessary - his footnote goes to Leslie Filson. I did not have this Filson book, but in history commens is a quote from this book, which seems to contradict Paul Schreyer:

The 1st Air Force’s official history of the response to the 9/11 attacks will later suggest that Boston Center is not following normal procedures when it makes this call to NEADS. It states: “If normal procedures had taken place… Powell (NEADS) probably wouldn’t have taken that phone call. Normally, the FAA would have contacted officials at the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center who would have contacted the North American Aerospace Defense Command. The secretary of defense would have had to approve the use of military assets to assist in a hijacking, always considered a law enforcement issue.” The only explanation it gives for this departure from protocol is that “nothing was normal on Sept. 11, 2001, and many say the traditional chain of command went by the wayside to get the job done.”
Filson, 2003, pp. 51
(8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Notifies NEADS of Hijacking, against Normal Procedures; Accounts Conflict over Timing
http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a837noradnotified#a837noradnotified

@JTL
Immediate scrambling is allowed for following situations, which do not include hijackings:

"4.5.4. Immediate Response may include DoD assistance to civil agencies in meeting the following types of need:

4.5.4.1. Rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment of casualties, maintenance or restoration of emergency medical capabilities, and safeguarding the public health.
4.5.4.2. Emergency restoration of essential public services (including firefighting, water, communications, transportation, power, and fuel).
4.5.4.3. Emergency clearance of debris, rubble, and explosive ordnance from public facilities and other areas to permit rescue or movement of people and restoration of essential services.
4.5.4.4. Recovery, identification, registration, and disposal of the dead.
4.5.4.5. Monitoring and decontaminating radiological, chemical, and biological effects; controlling contaminated areas; and reporting through national
warning and hazard control systems.
4.5.4.6. Roadway movement control and planning.
4.5.4.7. Safeguarding, collecting, and distributing food, essential supplies, and materiel on the basis of critical priorities.
4.5.4.8. Damage assessment.
4.5.4.9. Interim emergency communications.
4.5.4.10. Facilitating the reestablishment of civil government functions.
DODD 3025.1, January 15, 1993
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302501p.pdf

Necessity of phone call

Also Colin Scoggins, Military Liaison at FAA Boston Center on 9/11, says that Marr´s call to Arnold regarding the scrambling of the Otis jets was unnecessary because Marr had the authority to scramble jets on his own.

Source: http://sites.google.com/site/911guide/cs

hijack standard protocol

Marr did not have the authority, because the secretary of defense (Rumsfeld) would have had to authorize the scramble in the case of a hijacking. It has simple no importance, that a FAA-center in Boston had a different interpretation of a FAA-regulation, which says, that the FAA-hijack-coordinator "will advise the appropriate center/control tower of the identification of the military unit and location tasked to provide the hijack escort." Before that, the NMCC gave the hijack-coordinator these information.

sources:
"In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA. The NMCC will, with the exception of immediate responses as authorized by reference d, forward requests for DOD assistance to the Secretary of Defense for approval." http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01a.pdf

"reference d", 4.7.1. Immediate Response.
Requests for an immediate response (i.e., any form of immediate action taken by a DoD Component or military commander to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions) may be made to any Component or Command. The DoD Components that receive verbal requests from civil authorities for support in an exigent emergency may initiate informal planning and, if required, immediately respond as authorized in DoD Directive 3025.1 (reference (g)). DOD Directive 3025.15, 18 February 1997, "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities" (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01a.pdf).

4.4 The Secretary of Defense retains approval authority for support to civil authorities involving: use of Commander in Chief (CINC)-assigned forces (personnel units, and equipment) when required under paragraph 4.5, below; DoD support that will result in a planned event with the potential for confrontation with specifically identified individuals and/or goups or will result in the use of lethal force. Nothing in this Directive prevents a commander from exercising his or her immediate emergency response authority as outlined in DoD Directive 3025.1 (reference (g)).
DODD 3025.15, Feb. 18, 1997

4.5.4. Immediate Response may include DoD assistance to civil agencies in meeting the following types of need:

4.5.4.1. Rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment of casualties, maintenance or restoration of emergency medical capabilities, and safeguarding the public health.
4.5.4.2. Emergency restoration of essential public services (including firefighting, water, communications, transportation, power, and fuel).
4.5.4.3. Emergency clearance of debris, rubble, and explosive ordnance from public facilities and other areas to permit rescue or movement of people and restoration of essential services.
4.5.4.4. Recovery, identification, registration, and disposal of the dead.
4.5.4.5. Monitoring and decontaminating radiological, chemical, and biological effects; controlling contaminated areas; and reporting through national
warning and hazard control systems.
4.5.4.6. Roadway movement control and planning.
4.5.4.7. Safeguarding, collecting, and distributing food, essential supplies, and materiel on the basis of critical priorities.
4.5.4.8. Damage assessment.
4.5.4.9. Interim emergency communications.
4.5.4.10. Facilitating the reestablishment of civil government functions.
DODD 3025.1, January 15, 1993

Theory vs. Reality

You said: "Marr did not have the authority, because the secretary of defense (Rumsfeld) would have had to authorize the scramble in the case of a hijacking." But that´s theory. If it were true in reality, than an approval of General Arnold alone would have had no effect. But in reality it did have. After Arnold´s approval the jets took off.

Well said!

You've hit the crux of it by pointing to certain key events that actually happened, which contradict the official explanation about procedural matters.

This is also why I ask the question about the Langley scramble. Obviously, those multi-layered steps (based on the supposed limitation imposed if it's a hijacking) weren't necessary, in either case!

Robin Hordon made the key point several months ago:

Without any doubts whatsoever...an "in-flight-emergency" takes precident over ALL aviation activities other than a REAL INVASION at which time the US Military declares SCATANA and takes control of everything to protect the USofA.

When there is no such national defense emergency, and there is a "in-flight-emergency", ALL appropriate military aviation assets are under the control of the FAA for its use to solve the in-flight-emergency...and IMMEDIATELY SO!

And isn't this just common sense? It were as though someone's house is burning down, a neighbor calls 911, dispatcher says, "Hold on, I need to call the Mayor to approve dispatching a fire truck." Nobody would take such a claim seriously. Yet we're supposed to believe essentially the same nonsense—when the question is about something exponentially more serious than a burning house.

Still no answer . . .

. . . to the question I asked. Take 2: "Then how do you explain the Langley scramble at 09:24?"

What was it for, based on the 4.5 list you present? Were these fighters scrambled for "disposal of the dead"? For "Roadway movement control and planning"? "Damage assessment"? Or because Scoggins had requested an immediate scramble to intercept an errant airliner?

scramble-permission

The reason is simple, Marr got the okay from Arnold:

The head of NEADS, Marr, calls Arnold at Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) in Florida. This phone call took 8 minutes. Arnold: “… go ahead and scramble them (..)” Arnold phones then the operation deputy at NORAD Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. The deputy tells him: “Yeah, we will work this with the NMCC. Go ahead (…)”
9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003

I think you're confusing . . .

. . . Langley with Otis.

Therefore, the question remains unanswered.

Moreover, even if my question were about Otis rather than Langley, I think your ellipses hide a key statement: "We'll get authorities later."

But meanwhile, the question is still unanswered—as it has been every time I've asked it.

Discussion

I do not confuse them, I just assume, that Col. Marr could rely on General Arnold promise to get the okay from nmcc - regarding to the later langley-scrambling as well.

I never saw any laws, which could support Hordens statements about in-flight-emergencies and shot-downs of hijacked planes.

So your answers do not change my opinion.

Never mind. You've answered the question.

With your acknowledgment that "I just assume . . ."

Sorry ...

... I´ve got no idea. My presentation was not intended to explain the scrambles but to show how the scrambles were obstructed.

Answer

Point 1

Several people were responsible in the first line. (a) FAA: the hijack-coordinator General Canavan who was in Puerto Rico that day. I have a chapter on this issue and this man in my book "Inside 9/11". (b) NMCC: General Montague Winfield who wasn´t on his post for the crucial hours. There´s also a chapter on this man in my book with all the details about NMCC and Captain Leidig. Scoggins at Boston Center was helping out, filling a gap in the chain of responsibility. (c) Marr was the responsible man for NEADS. He was on his post - but he appearantly obstructed the air defense, as shown in my film.

Point 2

Listen to the tapes also - it´s quite clear that Nasypany wanted to scramble and Marr resisted. This matches also with Lynn Spencer´s account ("Touching History", p. 112): "Nasypany gets on the shout line and requests that Marr scramble the alert F-16s at Langley." On the tapes you can hear, as he´s talking to Marr: "Battle stations or scramble?" Than Marr answers (not on tape), than again Nasypany: "Battle stations only Langley." According to the 9/11 Commission Interview "Nasypany thought to put the Langley scramble over Baltimore, and place a "barrier cap" between the hijack and Washington." But that good strategy was delayed for 15 minutes.

Point 4

The story of the young staffer approaching Cheney is still quite miracolous to me. To keep it simple and straight I stick to the facts that are not in dispute - at least officially: Cheney gave a shootdown order - and Marr didn´t convey it. This is official - but if you add Mineta´s testimony, saying Cheney was in the bunker much earlier, than it appears that Marr´s decision not to convey the order is quite crucial. And this decision is still not explained sufficiently. That´s why I chose it as a point in my argument.

point 4

"My point: Colonel Marr didn´t convey Cheney´s Shootdown Order to the pilots"

It is my understanding that Cheney did not have the authorization to order a shootdown. Only Rumsfeld and Bush had that authority.

Or is it all a red-herring?

There are others, such as Robin Hordon, who believe the Emergency Protocol extends all the way to the fighter pilots. If a fighter pilot sees a hijacked airliner heading for a nuclear power plant, or the Capitol, or the White House, do the rules really require waiting for the President to get out of the bathroom? Shootdown authorization could be an overstated formality, though if I were a fighter pilot it would be a great comfort to know that the Big Banana (or his DOD Secretary) has given the OK. I don't know the answer, but this needs to be investigated more closely. We can't take the official spin at face value on this.

Not according to this fighter

Not according to this fighter pilot. He says only the President.

http://911blogger.com/news/2011-07-10/video-911-fighter-pilot-col-tim-duffy

What would you expect him to say?

Particularly when he had already put his foot in it several times.

Such as when he noted that he and and Major Nash were held up at the runway "straining at the reins." That raised another pertinent question: Why were they held up for several additional and crucial minutes? One report actually blamed the FAA for failing to give them clearance to take off! But Scoggins vigorously disputed this, claiming he had called repeatedly asking if the fighters had launched yet, for what seemed like "an eternity."

Duffy didn't help matters either when he confirmed that they were in "full blower all the way." That statement was repeatedly cited by our side in exposing the "fuzzy math" of the second version of the story (the "NORAD Timeline.")

And why were they routed off to military air space over Long Island, instead of immediately forming a CAP over NYC, so that they were flying around in a circle while Flight #175 crashed in the South Tower? That too was blamed on the FAA refusing to give clearance. But it was either Duffy or Nash who later noted that they informed their FAA controller of their next step—obviously based on order they'd received further up their chain of command. That puts the finger back on the military, while the current M.O. is to blame everything on FAA.

Is it any wonder that he, too, will fall in behind what he's told to say?

No, Duffy's denial doesn't count for anything here. He would be shooting himself in the foot if he said anything that deviated from the script.

Duffy's story has been pretty

Duffy's story has been pretty consistent and honest in my opinion.

Relevance of shootdown order

The issue of the shootdown order is only one point. More important: why didn´t NEADS at least manage to intercept the planes? And it appears, one reason is Marr´s repeated attempt to obstruct and slow down the NEADS response.

Good point. Where were the

Good point. Where were the eyes in the sky even without a shootdown order?

Authority for shootdown order

You´re right. Only Bush had the authority to do so. That´s why Cheney claims, he had asked Bush before he gave the shootdown order. But if this alleged phone call from Cheney to Bush has taken place, is actually in dispute. Again, this question I have also discussed in detail in my book.

Related info... Gen. Larry Arnold concernig shootdown orders:

Posted by jimd3100, Sun Jul 10, 2011 5:27 pm
http://truthaction.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=7189

[snip]

Quote:
MR. HAMILTON: Let me see if I understand. The plane that was headed toward the Pentagon and was some miles away, there was an order to shoot that plane down.

http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm

No, there was not. In just a few minutes after this was said, you will see later this.....

Quote:
GEN. ARNOLD: That is correct. In fact, the American Airlines 77, if we were to have arrived overhead at that particular point, I don't think that we would have shot that aircraft down.

MR. HAMILTON: Because?

GEN. ARNOLD: Well, we had not been given authority --

http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm

[snip]

Quote:
MR. BEN-VENISTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following up on this shootdown authority, General Arnold, from what source did you receive the shootdown authority?

GEN. ARNOLD: I did not receive shootdown authority.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: You say it was received subsequent to the crash of 93?

GEN. ARNOLD: Yes, that's correct.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: From what source was that received?

GEN. ARNOLD: It was passed down to us from the NORAD, from Cheyenne Mountain, that they had received shootdown authority. And then, you know, the timeframe escapes me at the moment, but you know for example over the Washington, D.C. area it was declared a no-fly zone by clear -- just by the fact that any aircraft was present, if we could not determine if that aircraft was friendly, then we were cleared to shoot that aircraft down.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: When was the declaration of no-fly zone authorized?

GEN. ARNOLD: I don't know. It was shortly during that timeframe.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: So are you saying that that declaration gave you shootdown authority?

GEN. ARNOLD: It gave us -- that particular declaration that I am referring to is a class bravo airspace within the Washington, D.C. area that was shut down to aviation, except for military or for law enforcement emergency response aircraft at that particular time.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: To help me understand, does it mean once that condition exists, that unless you were able to determine that this was a friendly aircraft, which under the circumstances I suppose means under the control of the terrorists at that time making it an unfriendly aircraft, that you had authority --

GEN. ARNOLD: That's correct.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: -- by whatever means to bring that down?

GEN. ARNOLD: Yes. The --

MR. BEN-VENISTE: At what time during this process was that order issued, and who issued it?

GEN. ARNOLD: I do not know who issued it. It is my understanding it was issued by the president, or the vice president in his stead, that that order was issued. And it was issued around the time that we decided to put all the aircraft on the ground, as Secretary Mineta had referred to, at that particular time. So --

MR. BEN-VENISTE: We would ask you to supplement your testimony today with specific information about that. At what point was, to the best of your knowledge, any order received from either the president or the vice president of the United States with respect to action to be taken by the military in connection with the ongoing situation?

GEN. ARNOLD: It was my understanding that that occurred, the direct communication, to me. I can't answer if it was done at a higher level at some point in time around five minutes after the United 93 had crashed into Pennsylvania.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: And so you will be able to check the records of NORAD generally, or the DOD generally, to find out when a presidential directive was issued?

GEN. ARNOLD: I am sure General McKinley will do that for me.

http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm

Quote:
MR. HAMILTON: I just want to clarify a few things after listening to all this testimony. It's not all that clear to me. As of September 11th, only the president had the authority to order a shootdown of a commercial aircraft

GEN. ARNOLD: That's correct, sir.

MR. HAMILTON: Now, one of the things that's curious to me, General Arnold, you said that you did not learn of the presidential order until after United 93 had already crashed. That was about a little after 10 o'clock in the morning. The first notice of difficulty here was at 8:20 in the morning when a transponder goes off on the American Flight 11. I don't know how significant that is, but 20 minutes later you had notification of the possible hijack. So there's a long lapse of time here between the time you are initially alerted and you receive the order that you can shoot that aircraft down. Am I right about that?

GEN. ARNOLD: That's correct.

MR. HAMILTON: In your timeline, why don't you put in there when you were notified?

GEN. ARNOLD: Of which flight, sir?

MR. HAMILTON: Getting the notification from the president of the United States that you had the authority to shoot a commercial aircraft down is a pretty significant event. Why would that not be in your timeline?

GEN. ARNOLD: I don't know when that happened.

MR. HAMILTON: Had you ever received that kind of a notice before?

GEN. ARNOLD: Not to my knowledge.

MR. HAMILTON: So this is the first time in the history of the country that such an order had ever been given, so far as you know?

GEN. ARNOLD: Yes, sir. I'm sure there's a log that would tell us that, and I appreciate the question.

MR. HAMILTON: Maybe you could let us know that.

And then, finally, as I understand your testimony, it was not possible to shoot down any of these aircraft before they struck. Is that basically correct?

GEN. ARNOLD: That is correct. In fact, the American Airlines 77, if we were to have arrived overhead at that particular point, I don't think that we would have shot that aircraft down.

MR. HAMILTON: Because?

GEN. ARNOLD: Well, we had not been given authority --

MR. HAMILTON: You didn't have authority at that point.

GEN. ARNOLD: And, you know, it is through hindsight that we are certain that this was a coordinated attack on the United States.

MR. LEHMAN: But had you gotten notified earlier, 77's deviance, about when it turned east, for instance, certainly you could have gotten the F-16s there, and certainly there would have been time to communicate to either get or deny authority, no? -- for 77?

GEN. ARNOLD: I believe that to be true. I believe that to be true. That had happened very fast, but I believe that to be true.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: What efforts were made that day to contact the president to seek that authority?

GEN. ARNOLD: I do not know.

http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm

[snip]
.

The call where NEADS requested three Langley jets, not two:

I need to look into this more, but I have found a section in one of the NEADS tapes transcripts where--around 9:15 a.m., it appears--Major James Anderson called Langley Air Force Base, spoke to Craig Borgstrom, and discussed scrambling three jets instead of two from the base. The transcript is here:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/14142092/NYC-Box-3-Neadsconrnorad-Fdr-Transcript-Neads-Channel-19-Sd2-Op-008
(See pp. 4-5 of the pdf.)

However, it is unclear if this was the only call about the matter, or if there was a further call in which it was discussed: At the end of this call, Anderson told Borgstrom: "Okay. Just stand by to stand by. We'll let you know if we need to do that" (i.e. launch three fighters instead of two). So this would indicate that NEADS planned to call Langley AFB again.

ptech in basement of faa for two years prior to 9/11

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=125&topic_id=35253&mesg_id=35611

Remember risk architect Indira Singh of JP Morgan Chase, and her testimony at '04 Citizen's Commission? Well worth re-listening/reading. Incredible and frightening. Too late now for further discussion.

Thanks for this!

Thanks for this, shoestring. Very helpful. I will also look deeper into this issue.

In Col. Tim Duffy's opinion,

In Col. Tim Duffy's opinion, a "6-ship" CAP (Combat Air Patrol) should have been set up over NY. But instead he was "forced into a 2-ship", which meant that they were strestched real thin directly after the hit on the towers.

In short Col. Tim Duffy is lost as to why only him and Nash were sent to perform CAPs on 9/11.