With Regards To Philip Zelikow, What Qualifies As Suspicious Behavior?



Jon Gold
1/17/2017

If you don’t know who he is, Philip Zelikow was the Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission. Paul Sperry wrote, “though he has no vote, (Zelikow) arguably has more sway than any member, including the chairman. Zelikow picks the areas of investigation, the briefing materials, the topics for hearings, the witnesses, and the lines of questioning for witnesses… In effect, he sets the agenda and runs the investigation.”

Over the years, we have read several reports having to do with the “suspicious behavior” of Philip Zelikow. As it states in the linked article “on October 9th, 2010, during “Freedom Watch” with Judge Napolitano, 9/11 Whistleblower Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer alleges that during a lunch in Philadelphia, a 9/11 Commissioner told him that, “everybody on the commission was covering for someone.” The following week, Judge Napolitano asked Philip Zelikow to appear on the show to talk about this. He REFUSED.”

I had read another story recently where Zelikow refused an “on-camera interview,” and it occurred to me that I have seen him do things like refuse interviews or comments several times over the years. In the article that I read, it states “Zelikow (they spelled it Zeleco, but I fixed it) declined an on-camera interview but says he pulled no punches and says the commission was well aware of the NSA's findings about al Qaeda even if the raw intelligence wasn't fully explored.”

That is bullshit. The idea that they “pulled no punches” or were “well aware of the NSA’s findings about al Qaeda” considering the lengths they went to avoid the NSA, is laughable.

Anyway, I did a little research and found other instances where Zelikow refused a comment or interview.

In this report from 2004, it says “through a Miller Center spokesperson, Zelikow declined to comment.” In this report from 2006, it says “Zelikow didn't respond to e-mail and telephone queries from McClatchy Newspapers” (that is probably my favorite example). In this report from 2008, it says “calls to 9/11 Executive Director Philip Zelikow seeking comment were not returned and 9/11 Commission Chairman Tom Kean could not yet be reached.” In this report from 2008, it says “Zelikow refused to be interviewed in person for Shenon’s book, insisting instead that all questions be submitted in writing via email, which was also the way he answered them” (to be fair, that report actually gets into correspondence between Phil Shenon and Zelikow).

Normally, when you hear that someone refuses to comment or refuses an interview, you AUTOMATICALLY think that particular someone has something to hide. Well, NOTHING is different in this case. Philip Zelikow needs to answer for everything that he has done.

In the “Post-9/11 World” we are asked to report “suspicious behavior.” What number do I call to report Philip Zelikow’s behavior?

new book about the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation program

New Book about the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation (Torture) Program Fails the Sniff test

by Mark H Gaffney, author of Black 9/11 (2012, 2016, 2nd edition)

James Mitchell’s best-selling new book, Enhanced Interrogation, offers an invaluable insider’s account of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program. The author is a retired US Air Force officer with a PhD in clinical psychology. From August 2002 through January 2009, Dr. Mitchell helped develop the EI program and also served as an interrogator; that is, until Obama shut the program down by executive order.

Mitchell’s book offers a defense of enhanced interrogation techniques, including water-boarding, as necessary to defend the nation against terrorism, a dubious claim, in my opinion. The author goes to great lengths to fend off charges by Sen. Diane Feinstein and others that he tortured 9/11 detainees for the CIA. He argues that water-boarding is not torture. His arguments did not sway me, however. Of course, the reader is free to make up his/her own mind. But I came down on the side of torture based on the material in the book and my own research.

Beyond the torture issue, Mitchell’s book has major problems. Although the author obviously wrote it to defend himself, which is understandable given the personal attacks he faced, his book also serves the double purpose of shoring up the official 9/11 narrative. This is undoubtedly why the CIA cleared Mitchell to reveal previously classified details about Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM).

Readers should not be fooled by Mitchell’s criticism of some CIA practices and policies. The CIA obviously felt that reiterating the official 9/11 story was so important that it was worth taking some hits about its EIT program.

Why else would they allow Mitchell to print material that was deemed so sensitive in 2003 that the sitting CIA chief George Tenet refused to allow the 9/11 Commission to interview the 9/11 detainees, nor even to consult with the CIA officers who had interrogated them? And this despite the fact the Commission was armed with a congressional mandate and subpoena authority. Tenet was adamant; no access was granted. The national security state, not Congress, would call the shots.

The 9/11 Commission was forced to rely on third-hand CIA write-ups that raised more questions than they answered. Most of the 9/11 Commission Report was based on these third-hand accounts; which from the standpoint of truth-telling explains why the report is essentially garbage, not worth the paper it was printed on.

Consider also the taped interrogations of Zubaydah and KSM. Mitchell mentions these videos (p. 249, 260) and makes it clear he strongly supported the CIA decision to destroy them. Why destroy them? In the author’s own words: “for the good of the country.” But this is hogwash. Mitchell’s more likely motivation was to shield himself and the other interrogators from possible criminal prosecution by the Justice Department.

As we know, then CIA-chief Michael Hayden served up another reason when he claimed that the tapes were destroyed because they posed “a security risk.” When pressed, Hayden explained that if the tapes had become public they would have put CIA officers and their families at risk of reprisals by Al Qaeda. That might have sounded half-way convincing in 2007 but has become threadbare with the passage of time.

No, there is a more plausible reason why the tapes were destroyed: if they had been released they would have exposed the official 9/11 narrative for the tapestry of lies that it is. Again, this explains the CIA’s willingness to take some criticism from Mitchell.

We learned in 2009, for instance, that nearly everything the CIA told us about Abu Zubaydah was wrong. Worse, it was a lie, because the CIA apparently knew all along that Zubaydah had no connection to Al Qaeda. This is surely why no charges were ever brought against him.

If you are skeptical about this, Google Brent Mickum, The truth about Abu Zubaydah, The Guardian, March 30, 2009

Also Google Kevin Ryan, Abu Zubaydah Poses a Real Threat to al-Qaeda, Foreign Policy Journal, October 17, 2012

The CIA had to perpetuate the fabric of lies about Zubaydah because the legend of the man spun by the CIA was crucial to build popular support for the invasion of Iraq, the creation of military tribunals, domestic spying, the encroaching police state, and the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program itself.

No doubt, this also explains why, 16 years after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the government has yet to bring the master-mind, KSM, to trial. Nor will it -- ever. The last thing the CIA wants is to allow KSM an opportunity to tell his side of the story in a courtroom.

The reader is advised to keep the bigger picture in mind. Plane impacts and kerosene fueled fires cannot turn steel-frame buildings to dust and cause them to come crashing down. Facts are facts. The World Trade Center collapses were controlled demolitions executed in broad daylight for purposes so dark and evil it beggars our capacity as humans to comprehend.

I mention this to provide some much needed context. Mitchell’s long-winded diatribes to the contrary notwithstanding, the problem has never been that “they hate us.” No, the problem has always been the shadow government’s drive for world hegemony and its failed foreign policies.