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CIA Director George Tenet Facilitated 9/11

After becoming Director of the CIA (DCI) in 1997, George Tenet did what Louis Freeh had done after his appointment as FBI Director. He began to cultivate close personal relationships with the rulers of Saudi Arabia. Like Freeh, Tenet grew especially close to Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States. Bandar and Tenet often met at Bandar’s home near Washington yet Tenet did not share information from those meetings with his own officers who were handling Saudi issues at the Agency. The CIA’s Saudi specialists only learned about Tenet’s dealings with the Saudi authorities inadvertently, through their Saudi contacts. It seems that Tenet was operating within a network that surpassed the interests of the American public. Therefore the unsolved crimes of 9/11, attributed largely to young men from Saudi Arabia, should be considered in light of Tenet’s actions.

As Deputy Director for the CIA, in 1996, Tenet had worked to install one of his closest friends and confidants, John Brennan, as CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia. Brennan is now the DCI but, in his previous role, Brennan often communicated directly with Tenet, avoiding the usual chain of command. At the time, as an apparent favor to the Saudis, CIA analysts were discouraged from questioning Saudi relationship to Arab extremists.

The unusual relationship that both George Tenet and Louis Freeh had with Saudi intelligence (and George H.W. Bush) recalls the private network that was created in the mid-1970s to accomplish covert actions though means of proxies. This private network included disgruntled CIA officers who had been fired by President Carter, as well as the group known as The Safari Club, and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI).

The Safari Club resulted from an agreement between Saudi Arabian intelligence chief Kamal Adham, Anwar Sadat of Egypt, the Shah of Iran, and French intelligence director Alexandre de Marenches. The BCCI network grew, with the blessing of DCI George H.W. Bush, through the guidance of the Safari Club, which needed a network of banks to help fund proxy operations, including off-the-books operations required by the CIA. This private network was utilized in the arming of the Mujahideen, the precursor to al Qaeda.

The U.S. aid to the Mujahideen did not officially start until 1980 but went on for many years under the name Operation Cyclone. This operation relied heavily on using the Pakistani ISI as an intermediary for funds and weapons distribution, military training, and financial support. Evidence suggests that covert U.S. support for a “CIA within a CIA” existed twenty years later, when Tenet began leading the CIA, and that terrorist operations were among those that were funded.

tenet and bushThat possibility underscores the failure of George Tenet’s leadership of the CIA as the Agency failed miserably to detect and prevent al Qaeda terrorism. This failure might make more sense in light of British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook’s claim that al Qaeda was not originally a terrorist group but a database of operatives used by the CIA. In any case, it was almost as if Tenet wanted al Qaeda to not only remain viable, but to be seen as an ever-looming threat.

For example, in February 1998, Al Qaeda made public its second fatwah, repeating its declaration of holy war against the United States and its allies. It included the signatures of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, head of the Jihad Group in Egypt. What did George Tenet’s CIA do in response?

  • According to CIA officer Michael Scheuer, “The Agency’s Bin Laden unit was ordered disbanded” in April 1998. Although Tenet rescinded the order later, Scheuer commented that “the on-again, off-again signals about the unit’s future status made for confusion, distraction, and much job-hunting in the last few weeks” before the embassy attacks.
  • In May 1998, Tenet traveled to Saudi Arabia to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. Tenet and Abdullah made a secret agreement that Bin Laden, if captured, would not be given to the U.S. for trial but instead given to the Saudis. Recommending that the Saudis bribe the Taliban to turn Bin Laden over, Tenet canceled the CIA’s own operation to get Bin Laden.
  • Michael Scheuer claimed that, between May 1998 and May 1999, U.S. leaders passed up ten opportunities to capture Bin Laden. According to Scheuer, it was George Tenet and his deputies who rejected the proposals. 
Apparently two declarations of holy war by al Qaeda were not enough to compel George Tenet to increase his agency’s focus on Bin Laden. Not only that, Tenet seemed to intentionally back off pursuing Bin laden in 1998 and 1999, obstructing U.S. attempts to capture al Qaeda’s leader.

The result was the August 7, 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa. The date of the bombings marked the eighth anniversary of the arrival of American forces in Saudi Arabia. Just months before the bombings, the CIA had been warned by the Kenyan Intelligence Service that the embassy in Nairobi was going to be attacked by al Qaeda. But the CIA ignored the warning. Not only that, but the embassy bombings were “carried out by a cell that U.S. agents had already uncovered.”

Late that year, in a memo to the CIA, George Tenet declared war against al Qaeda. He wrote that “Our work to date has been remarkable and in some cases heroic” but “we must now redouble our efforts against Bin Ladin himself, his infrastructure, followers, finances, etc with a sense of enormous urgency.” He said, “We are at war…. I want no resources or people spared… either inside CIA or the [U.S. intelligence] community.”

Although meetings were held, Tenet did not attend them and his deputy went only once. The meetings were attended by few if any officers from other agencies and quickly stopped addressing the fight against al Qaeda. No other plan was made at the CIA or elsewhere in the U.S. intelligence community, as a result of this declaration of war by Tenet, to defeat al Qaeda.

Despite the attempts by Tenet and others to hype the threat from Bin Laden and his alleged network, as of August 1999 not even The Washington Post appeared to be convinced of the threat. Reporters Colum Lynch and Vernon Loeb at the Post questioned the emerging legend of al Qaeda by writing, “for all its claims about a worldwide conspiracy to murder Americans, the government’s case is, at present, largely circumstantial. The indictment never explains how bin Laden runs al Qaeda or how he may have masterminded the embassy bombings.”

Behind the scenes, Tenet’s lack of action suggested that he was also unconcerned. An example was given in March 1999 when German intelligence provided to the CIA the mobile phone number and first name of one of the alleged 9/11 hijackers—Marwan Al-Shehhi. The CIA did nothing with the information. Although Tenet later dismissed its importance, others said that the number could have been easily traced, leading to the capture of Al-Shehhi.

Additionally, the CIA appeared “to have been investigating the man who recruited the [alleged 9/11] hijackers at the time he was recruiting them.” Although there is no evidence that the CIA took actions to stop the plot as it was unfolding, there were many interesting leads to follow. For example, in the summer of 1999 Bin Laden was reportedly given $50 million by a group of oil-rich sheikhs. The New York Times reported on this gift which came via a single bank transfer: “The Central Intelligence Agency has obtained evidence that Mr. Bin Laden has been allowed to funnel money through the Dubai Islamic Bank in Dubai, which the United Arab Emirates Government effectively controls.”

The links between al Qaeda and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were far greater, however. These included that the alleged plot architect Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM) was said to be living in Sharjah, UAE as of 1999. Sharjah was reportedly a major center of al Qaeda activity at the time. One of the alleged hijackers, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, was from Sharjah, as was alleged plot financier Mustafa Ahmed Al-Hawsawi. All of the alleged 9/11 hijackers traveled through the UAE on their way to the United States, other than Mohamed Atta, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar, the latter of whom was said to be the one to facilitate the travel of the others. Accused hijacker pilot Ziad Jarrah was detained and questioned in January 2000 at Dubai Airport. However, CIA and UAE officials failed to warn German intelligence about Jarrah, who traveled on to Hamburg.

Overall, the lack of communication and action taken by DCI Tenet regarding the men who would be accused of perpetrating the 9/11attacks was reflective of the same attitude exhibited by FBI Director Louis Freeh. With the strong ties between Tenet’s good friend Clarke and the UAE, it would seem that much could have been done to stop the 9/11 attacks long before they happened.

Perhaps coincidentally, the CIA’s tracking of two 9/11 suspects who did not travel to the U.S. through the UAE has been reported extensively. This began with the monitoring of a January 2000 meeting in Malaysia attended by KSM and several other alleged al Qaeda leaders. The meeting included the two alleged 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi. These are the two suspects who Tenet claimed the CIA had been looking for only in the few weeks before 9/11. The CIA must not have been looking too hard because when the two suspects came to the U.S., they lived in San Diego with an FBI asset.

With regard to the CIA’s failed communications prior to 9/11, author Kevin Fenton lets Tenet off the hook, saying that there is “no evidence of [Tenet] doing anything intentionally wrong before the attacks. Fenton acknowledges that Tenet lied extensively in testimony to the Joint Congressional Inquiry, and that he gave “a string of evasive answers” to the 9/11 Commission. Yet Fenton’s premise is that low-level CIA and FBI officers kept a secret plan [the hiding of evidence about the two suspects] from their superiors.

The facts, however, suggest that high-level CIA leadership was behind the orders to hide the evidence about Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi. Examples include the failure of the CIA station in Bangkok to communicate that the two suspects had left Thailand for the U.S., and the order referenced by the CIA station chief in Kuala Lumpur when he said that he was not supposed to show certain photographs related to the men. Although that order was disobeyed, and the surveillance photos of the Malaysia meeting were shared with FBI officers, such an order to a CIA station chief could not have come from low-level officers. Control of multiple CIA stations could only come from the top.

While the CIA withheld information about Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi living in the United States, Tenet simultaneously kept the threat hype going. A month after the Malaysia meeting, he told the U.S. Senate that Bin Laden was planning “to strike further blows against America.”

Despite this apparent threat, Tenet had not ordered a National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism in his entire tenure, the last one having been produced in 1997. According to the 9/11 Commission, Tenet finally recognized this need and charged the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center with making a strategic assessment. But as with so many other coincidences, the person who was to lead the assessment didn’t start work until the day before 9/11.

U.S. intelligence officers later said they were told to back-off investigation of Bin Laden and the Saudis. After the Bush Administration took over in January 2001, there was a “major policy shift” at the National Security Agency in that OBL could still be investigated, but they could not look at where he got his money.

Adding to suspicions about Tenet are the mysterious links between Tenet’s mentor, David Boren, and training for the alleged hijackers. Currently the co-chair of President Obama’s Intelligence Advisory Board, Boren is the long-time president of the University of Oklahoma, which has its own airport. In the years before 9/11, the FBI came to the airport several times to talk to people there about the training of terrorism suspects. It was later learned that the university airport was where Zacarias Moussaoui trained to fly, and that Mohamed Atta and other alleged hijackers had called, emailed and visited the airport in the two years before 9/11.

These clues were ignored as Tenet refused to cooperate with the official investigations into the events of 9/11 and as he lied to representatives of the U.S. Congress. Tenet lied to the 9/11 Commission about having met with President Bush in the month before the attacks. He lied under oath about CIA foreknowledge of the alleged hijackers, and he lied to the 9/11 Commission by failing to tell them about torture videos that his subordinates later destroyed.

The facts show that, as DCI from 1997 to 2004, Tenet was responsible for an agency that had, at the very least, failed miserably to perform its duties related to counterterrorism. Overall the evidence suggests that, as with Louis Freeh and the FBI, some of those failures were intentional. Concerns that Tenet and Freeh had developed secret paths of communication with Saudi authorities, and that they might have disrupted plans to capture or investigate al Qaeda suspects, were never addressed. Therefore, an ongoing investigation into 9/11 should include George Tenet and his actions leading up to the attacks.

Tenet

"With regard to the CIA’s failed communications prior to 9/11, author Kevin Fenton lets Tenet off the hook, saying that there is “no evidence of [Tenet] doing anything intentionally wrong before the attacks. Fenton acknowledges that Tenet lied extensively in testimony to the Joint Congressional Inquiry, and that he gave “a string of evasive answers” to the 9/11 Commission. Yet Fenton’s premise is that low-level CIA and FBI officers kept a secret plan [the hiding of evidence about the two suspects] from their superiors.

The facts, however, suggest that high-level CIA leadership was behind the orders to hide the evidence about Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi. Examples include the failure of the CIA station in Bangkok to communicate that the two suspects had left Thailand for the U.S., and the order referenced by the CIA station chief in Kuala Lumpur when he said that he was not supposed to show certain photographs related to the men. Although that order was disobeyed, and the surveillance photos of the Malaysia meeting were shared with FBI officers, such an order to a CIA station chief could not have come from low-level officers. Control of multiple CIA stations could only come from the top.

While the CIA withheld information about Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi living in the United States, Tenet simultaneously kept the threat hype going. A month after the Malaysia meeting, he told the U.S. Senate that Bin Laden was planning “to strike further blows against America."

Fenton was just flat wrong, with all due respect. The fact that FBI Agent Ali Soufan flew out to Islamabad for a meeting with the FBI/CIA joint source on February 1, 2001, to show the joint source the passport photo of Walid bin Attash and was never told by the CIA Alat, who was sitting right next to him at this debriefing, that Walid bin Attash had just been identified in a Kuala Lupur photo by the FBI/CIA joint source on January 4, 2001, shows that Tenet was involved right up to his eye balls in this massive criminal conspiracy to hide the fact that Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting with bin Attash, planning the Cole bombing.

The Kuala Lumpur photos of both Walid bin Attash and Khalid al-Mihdhar had been obtained by the Yemen CIA station from the CIA bin Laden station, just after the December 16, 2000 identification of Walid bin Attash from his passport by the FBI/CIA joint source. When bin Attash was identified in his Kuala Lumpur photo the CIA realized that they had observed the very meeting where the planning of the Cole bombing had taken place, photographed all of the attendees to this meeting and then let them all walk way to carry out the Cole bombing.

This was the horrific secret that the CIA was trying to keep away from the FBI Cole bombing investigators. Keeping this identification secret required the full cooperation of the CIA HQ bin Laden station, the CIA Yemen Station and the CIA Pakistan station, and even making sure all of the emails on the bin Attash identification from the Kuala Lumpur photo from all CIA stations was scrubbed clean before they went to the FBI and Ali Soufan. No one other than CIA Director George Tenet had the authority over these different CIA stations to have been able to do this

The tragic fact is that Khalid Sheik Mohammed was also at the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting, had been photographed at that meeting, and actually planned the attacks on 9/11 right at this meeting. By hiding the information on Mihdhar and Hazmi from the FBI, the CIA allowed the attacks to take place on 9/11.

But it is even worse than that, on August 22, 2001, the CIA found out that both Midhar and Hazmi were inside of the US, even knew they were inside the US in order to take part in a massive al Qaeda terrorist attack that would kill thousands of Americans. This information also went to FBI HQ's, to ITOS Deputy Chief Tom Wilshire and a FBI IOS agent Dina Corsi who was acting as his assistant. Incredibly Wilshire and Corsi, under orders from the CIA HQ, tried to keep the information that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US secret from FBI Agent Steve Bongardt and his team, the team that was investigating the Cole bombing. Corsi under orders from Wilshire wrote up an EC to start a intelligence investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi, knowing this would keep Bongardt from being able to start any criminal investigation for these al Qaeda terrorists.

But when Corsi’s EC came over to the New York office of the FBI on August 28, 2001, to a Craig Donnachie, he sent it to John Liguori, his supervisor. Liguori thought this connected both Mihdhar and Hazmi to people who were already connected with the planning of the Cole bombing and sent this EC to FBI Agent Steve Bongardt.

Bongardt immediately called Corsi and requested that this investigation be given to him and his team, since he thought these terrorists are inside of the US in order to carry out some horrific al Qaeda attack, and he had an experienced team already in place that could find these terrorists quickly before they carried out this attack.

But Corsi told Bongardt that he and his team were not even allowed to look at the NSA information in her EC, due to the NSA caveat on this information at the bottom of every NSA cable, in spite of the fact that she had already received the release from the NSA to give this very information to him the day before. She tells him that he must destroy her EC and that he will not be allowed to take part in any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. Corsi even tells Bongardt that if even one piece of paper is ever found at the FBI with Mihdhar’s name and his name he will be through forever working at the FBI (See testimony September 20, 2002 Joint Inquiry Committee).

Bongardt then requested that Corsi get an opinion from the NSLU, the FBI legal people at FBI HQ’s to see if they will allow him to start an investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi, since he did not see any connection between the NSA information and a FISA warrant, the only reason he felt why he would be denied this information.

On August 29, 2001, Corsi tells Bongardt that the NSLU lawyer she had contacted had ruled he could not take part in any investigation for Midhar and Hazmi. Bongardt tells Corsi that because of this ruling someday [many] Americans will die. But according to the 9/11 Commission report the attorney Corsi had consulted, NSLU Attorney Sherry Sabol, tells DOJ IG investigators on November 7, 2002 that she told Corsi that since the NSA information had no connection to any FISA warrant, Bongardt could talked part in any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi and if Corsi was still confused she could go to the NSA and get a release herself unaware that Corsi had already been given this release two days earlier. (See 9/11 Commission report page 538, footnote 81).

On August 29, 2001, FBI Agent Robert Fuller, an inexperienced FBI agent, who had never done any intelligence investigation before, was given the intelligence investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. The EC to start this intelligence investigation was marked "Routine", the absolute lowest level of precedence in spite of the fact that Corsi had been told by FBI Agent Bongardt that it is obvious that these terrorists are inside of the US for no other reason than to carry out a horrific al Qaeda terrorist attack

On August 30, 2001, the CIA sends the photograph of Walid Bin Attash, aka Khallad, to the FBI HQ and requests that it be given to Rod Middleton, Corsi’s supervisor. In spite of the fact that Middleton had also been on the phone in a conference call with Corsi to Bongardt shutting down his investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, and had been at the meeting with Sherry Sabol, where Sabol told Corsi and Middleton that Bongardt could take part in any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. Even though Middleton now also had photographic proof that both Mihdhar and Hazmi had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing, he never calls Bongardt back to allow him to start any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. This is two weeks before the attacks on 9/11.

On September 4, 2001, Robert Fuller finally starts on a “Routine” investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi.

September 5, 2001 - Robert Fuller calls FBI Agent Dina Corsi and tells her that he has gotten nowhere in his investigation to locate Mihdhar and Hazmi, and that he has failed to find any information in the FBI data base “Choicepoint” on these terrorists. He requests that she give him permission to contact Saudi Arabian Airlines to get Mihdhar’s credit card number so he will have more to go on in the FBI data base. Corsi refuses to give Fuller permission even though she knows this will likely make his investigation fail to locate Mihdhar and Hazmi. (See DE #650. )

George Tenet will note after the attacks on 9/11 that Mihdhar’s and Hazmi’s credit cards were used to pay for 10 of the airline tickets used by the hijackers on 9/11.

September 11, 2001 - Fuller had gotten nowhere by the time the attacks on the WTC towers take place. He and Bongardt are told shortly after this attack that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were on AA 77 that hit the Pentagon.

It is clear that Richard Blee, Cofer Black and George Tenet knew that the al Qaeda terrorists were just about to attack the US in the June 2001, knew this attack would kill thousands of Americans and still refused to give FBI ITOS manager, Tom Wilshire permission to give the Kula Lumpur information to the FBI. Tom Wilshire, the former Deputy chief of the CIA bin Laden station had been moved over to be Deputy Chief of the FBI ITOS unit in mid-May 2001, and had requested permission to pass the Kuala Lumpur information to the FBI Cole bombing investigators twice in July 2001, on July 13, and July 23, 2001. Blee, Black and ultimately Tenet had completely refused his request. But Blee, Black and Tenet knew about a huge al Qaeda terrorists attack about to take place inside of the US, even knew by August 22, 2001 that Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were in the US in order to take part in this attack, and clearly knew by denying Wilshire permission to transfer the Kuala Lumpur information to the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing that these investigators would never have the probable cause they needed to start any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi and stop this attack.

It is clear that Tom Wilshire was overseeing Corsi’s request to ask Donnachie for an intelligence investigation to head off any investigation by Steve Bongardt and his team, and had overseen Corsi’s work on her EC, even knowing that it specified “Routine” when both Corsi and Wilshire knew that these terrorists were inside of the US in order to carry out another al Qaeda attack that would kill thousands of Americans.

It is also clear that Middleton had photographic proof that Mihdhar and Hazmi had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing on August 30, 2001, and still refused to give the FBI Cole bombing investigators permission to start a criminal investigation for these terrorists.

These actions taken together demonstrate that managers at the highest levels of the CIA, Blee, Black and Tenet, and perhaps may others and many FBI mangers, and agents at FBI HQ's, including Middleton Wilshire and Corsi conspired to shut down FBI Agent Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi when they knew it would result in allowing the al Qaeda terrorists to murder thousands of Americans.

And much of this information including connecting the dots has been coved up by the Joint Inquiry Committee investigation, the 9/11 Commission investigation and even the DOJ IG investigation.

Tenet did what he was told

Tenet knew something big was coming -- but probably was not fully briefed himself.

Despite his role as CIA chief Tenet did not have a need to know.

By contrast, his number three man Buzzy Krongard who was connected to Wall Street was apparently fully in the loop. The CIA chain of command was irrelevant.

On the first page of his memoirs Tenet describes his shock when he arrived bright and early at the WH on September 12, 2001. Guess who was there already? No less than the prince of darkness Richard Perle who undoubtedly had come very early to brief GW Bush about what he needed to know for the next phase of the 9/11 operation.

I take Tenet at his word. He is not lying in his memoirs when he expresses puzzlement and confusion about why Perle would be at the WH the morning after. If Tenet had been fully in the loop, would he have mentioned this? No.

Curious also that Tenet confuses the North and South Towers (see his memoirs p. 162-163). It's almost as if his brain was on stand by. Somehow he just didn't get it.

This is not the sort of man who is capable of orchestrating a black op like 9/11. Tenet was a small piece of the big picture and was kept well compartmentalized. Like all good foot soldiers he simply did what he was told.

No surprise that Rumsfeld did not take Tenet seriously -- and even treated him with amused contempt.

Tenet

It is Tenet himself that over saw the withholding of information on the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting from the FBI Cole bombing investigators.

No one else at the CIA had the management breath and oversight to have done this. This withholding of this information from the FBI Cole bombing investigators, spanned the CIA Pakistan Station, the CIA Yemen Station, the CIA bin Laden station, perhaps the Malaysian CIA Station, and even perhaps many more CIA stations.

Tenet initialed the move by Tom Wilshire to the FBI ITOS unit, in order to have a CIA spy inside of the FBI HQ and find out what the FBI Cole bombing investigators knew about the Kuala Lumpur meeting and did they know that Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting planning the Cole bombing with Walid bin Attash.

It was also Tenet that made sure that his spy inside of the FBI, Tom Wilshire was never given permission to pass the Kuala Lumpur information to the FBI Cole bombing investigators for fear it would expose the CIA's criminal culpability in allowing the Cole bombing attack. When he did this, he fully knew full well that this would most likely sabotage any chance that the FBI Cole bombing investigators would have to start any investigation for these two al Qaeda terrorists before they took part in this attack.

Tenet knew about the huge al Qaeda terrorist attack that just was about to kill thousands of Americans, knew by August 22, 2001 that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US in order to take part in this attack and even knew that denying Wilshire permission to send the Kuala Lumpur information to the FBI Cole bombing investigators, this would completely block their investigation of these two al Qaeda terrorist, which would allow the attacks on 9/11 to take place.

"I take Tenet at his word. He

"I take Tenet at his word. He is not lying in his memoirs when he expresses puzzlement and confusion about why Perle would be at the WH the morning after. If Tenet had been fully in the loop, would he have mentioned this? No."

Tenet was puzzled because he did not know why Pearle was at the White House just after the attack on 9/11. But it is now clear that Perle was Rumsfeld's man to get a war started with Iraq and was at the White House to push this idea and to promote this war. Since Bush was also on the same page this did not take much effort from Perle. Perle most likely did not know much about the warnings for the attacks on 9/11 unless Rumsfeld filled him in on the crystal clear warnings Rumsfeld had gotten from Tenet about this attack just about to take place inside of the US on July 17, 2001