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New Video--CIT: Deceptive Interview of Sgt. William Lagasse

A few months ago I wrote an analysis of the CIT interview of Sgt. William Lagasse. It occurred to me that so much of what he said pointed to a standard south path of the plane, yet on video he pointed to a path north of the CITGO station. This was puzzling to me and should have been puzzling to any honest investigative reporter or researcher. The big breakthrough for me was being pointed to the older PentaCon video by CIT, which is less edited than the more polished National Security Alert (NSA) video. There were cryptic statements near the end, where after drawing the line on the photograph Lagasse commented that the angle was wrong. And when Craig Ranke pointed out the location of the light poles Lagasse violently objected, that they were actually farther to the north, along the path he had drawn. Making sense of the chaotic information was a puzzle that seemed worth solving, and as I dug in, it all became much clearer.

I have had very little traffic to my article with this analysis, but the issue in growing increasingly relevant as the new generation of CIT followers has made headway in infiltrating high profile groups. Putting this information in video format puts it before the eyes of a larger audience, and links to the article gives the opportunity for a deeper dive. So I have posted the video on Odysee https://odysee.com/@davidchandler911:c/LagasseInterview:5 and embedded it at the top of the article itself: https://911speakout.org/interview-of-sgt-william-lagasse/.

 

Problematic Visual Flight Conditions Only Hours Before 9/11 Attacks

WTC SBS

After reportedly purchasing their flight’s tickets weeks earlier in August of 2001 and while possibly relying on limited radio frequency navigation aids, the accused 9/11 hijackers allegedly guided American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 visually into the WTC after descending into New York City airspace from 20,000 - 30,000 foot altitudes, a task made more difficult if not unlikely, had this been attempted through the dense cloud cover that largely hid the WTC just hours earlier on September 10, 2001.

The System Was Blinking Red: The Intelligence Communities Response To The 9/11 Attacks

“We are going to be struck soon. Many Americans are going to die and it could be in the United States.” — Cofer Black speech at Department of Defense coronation on counter-terrorism (8–15–2001)

There was an aura of heightened tension that encompassed every intelligence facility in the United States, even around the globe in the summer of 2001. The warning cables of an imminent attack upon the United States came from every corner of the earth. Italy, Spain, Lebanon, Germany, Israel, France, Canada, Egypt. The information, vague, Al Qaeda led by it’s emir, Osama Bin Laden, had a plot to conduct a massive domestic attack. But how, when?

By the Spring of 2001, Deputy Chief of Alec Station (Bin Laden Issue Station), Tom Wilshire was tasked to liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as it’s chief of counter-intelligence working directly under it’s Director, Michael Rolnice. Alec Station was the CIA virtual station dedicated to tracking down Osama Bin Laden, an idea born from David Cohen, head of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations. In 2000, it was CIA Director, George Tenet, who decided to change the station’s direction, and began implementing new ideas one that concentrated on having a more personal intervention towards Afghanistan. With a new Deputy, Richard Blee, the station began instituting drones as its eyes and ears while its new CTC Deputy, Cofer Black, wanted to infiltrate Al Qaeda, and create spies to gather human intelligence (HUMINT).

Wilshire, one of the elder statesmen of the unit, was tasked by Blee to assist the FBI counter-terrorism office in Washington. Wilshire had come under “suspicion” by withholding pertinent information from the FBI back in 2000. As the station had the passports, of Khalid al-Mihdhar copied and Nawaf al-Hazmi dual entry U.S visa known. Two of the station’s officers, Mark Rossini and Doug Miller, both from the FBI office in NYC, became aware of this cable. And tried to send this information back to FBI headquarters, where the cable, drafted by Miller, was put on hold. At Tom Wilshire’s request, which fell under his closest CIA liaison officer and head of the Yemen Hub ticket, Michael Anne Casey.

Wilshire had begun informing FBI headquarters about data the CIA were made aware of regarding the travel of two men who were also USS Cole bombing conspirators. He relays this to Dina Corsi, an FBI intelligence analyst with whom Wilshire began a rapport with in Washington D.C. There were certain FBI agents from New York City and Washington D.C who were already under suspicion of the CIA withholding information about the movements of Al Qaeda operatives. Including, Steve Bongardt, a top assistant from the FBI’s top counter-intelligence unit, to Ali Soufan. Bongradt, believes the CIA had withheld information regarding the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen. This notion was also echoed by John O’Neill, who was the FBI”s chief of the counter-intelligence bureau in NYC. Meanwhile Wilshire held a closed door meeting with a liaison officer from the CIA’s Counter-terrorist Center, Clark Shannon in the early afternoon hours of May 21st. Shannon gives Wilshire a timeline of events related to the USS Cole attack and they discuss Fahad al-Quso, a member of the bombing team in custody.

Wilshire wanted to connect two incidents together, the USS Cole bombing and participants of an Al Qaeda Summit Meeting which was held in Malaysia in January 2000. Was there a connection? However, the information he was compiling was being with-held, even from his FBI counter-parts in the Washington D.C office. Compiling notes and cables from Alec Station Wilshire was able to notice a glaring piece of information, both Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, were at the Summit Meeting. Wilshire would not share this information with the FBI.

The Saudi’s were closely monitoring al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi out West, in places such as Los Angeles, San Diego and Arizona. While the Israeli’s were monitoring Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah in the Eastern part of the country, in New York City, New Jersey and Florida.
Thru-ought the summer months of 2001, the CIA counter-terrorism center began receiving cables from its foreign intelligence counter-parts of Italy, Germany, Spain, Israel, Great Britain, Canada about a large scale attack happening inside the United States. The CIA’s Alec Station however was adamant about an attack somewhere in SE Asia. This is contradictory however to the cables from its own station, which showed two Al Qaeda operatives, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi already being inside the United States at this point.

July 10th 2001, National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, was tasked to look over the White House press briefing regarding a ceremony in regards to Captain Ed W. Freeman of the U.S Army receiving the Medal of Honor, when the phone rang. On the other end was a frantic George Tenet. Tenet was already en-route to the White House for an emergency meeting. It was the only time in Tenet’s career he would not announce himself before arriving. Tenet was adamant about Rice contacting the administrations top officials from the National Security Unit, he had information which was indeed dire.
Tenet was with Alec Station chief, Richard Blee, along with Rice and Richard Clarke, the chief of National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism. Blee began the meeting with a heightened tone, almost as if he was completely taken aback by the information he was presenting. Also present was Deputy National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley. Hadley asked Blee about the nature of the information he was receiving at the CIA’s counter-terrorism center. Blee however was rather “vague” about the pertinent details, and never mentioned once that the CIA was aware of two Al Qaeda operatives inside the U.S at this point. Blee however began the meeting regarding certain threats the country faces soon.

“A warning related to Chechen leader Ibn Khattab and seven pieces of intelligence the CIA recently received indicating there would soon be a terrorist attack.
A mid-June statement by bin Laden to trainees that there would be an attack in the near future. Information that talks about moving toward decisive acts Late-June information saying a “big event” was forthcoming. This did not mention what “kind” of event as forthcoming or when.

Two separate bits of information collected “a few days before the meeting” in which people predicted a “stunning turn of events” in the weeks ahead. This may be a reference to intercepts of calls in Yemen, possibly involving the father-in-law of 9/11 hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar.”

The System Was Blinking Red: The Intelligence Communities Response To The 9/11 Attacks

“We are going to be struck soon. Many Americans are going to die and it could be in the United States.” — Cofer Black speech at Department of Defense coronation on counter-terrorism (8–15–2001)

There was an aura of heightened tension that encompassed every intelligence facility in the United States, even around the globe in the summer of 2001. The warning cables of an imminent attack upon the United States came from every corner of the earth. Italy, Spain, Lebanon, Germany, Israel, France, Canada, Egypt. The information, vague, Al Qaeda led by it’s emir, Osama Bin Laden, had a plot to conduct a massive domestic attack. But how, when?

New Critique of the CIT Interview of Sgt William Lagasse

Previously on my website (https://911speakout.org) I posted an analysis of Craig Ranke's interview of Albert Hemphill that displays the deceptive interview techniques used to slant the interview toward a predetermined outcome of supposedly supporting the CIT North of CITGO hypothesis.

I have now added a second ananysis: the interview of Sgt. William Lagasse. Lagasse is CIT's star witness. It seems that email correspondence between Lagasse and Dick Eastman prior to CIT's interview may have been the origin of the North of CITGO hypothesis. In that email correspondence Lagasse makes the erroneous statement that he was standing on the "Starboard side of the aircraft." I say erroneous because the word "starboard" is used three times in that correspondence. It is first introduced by Eastman. Lagasse, who exhibits a fondness for using jargon, then uses the word, but the context shows he has port and starboard reversed in his mind. Therefore he is really saying he was on the left side of the plane, which is consistent with a South of CITGO flight path, which is consistent with the trail of physical evidence.

9/11 Cover Up Director (Philip Zelikow) Appointed to Chair COVID Cover Up Group 26 min

9/11 Cover Up Director (Philip Zelikow) Appointed to Chair COVID Cover Up Group 26 min

https://www.bitchute.com/video/iew3DIBAOLM/

Corbett Report Extras

corbettreport

New 9/11 Timeline Entries: Richard Myers's Actions During the Attacks, Pre-9/11 Warnings About Al-Qaeda, and More

From the History Commons Groups blog:

A large number of entries have been added to the Complete 9/11 Timeline at History Commons. The majority of these deal with events that took place on September 11, 2001, with a particular focus on the actions of General Richard B. Myers, the highest-ranking military officer in the United States when the terrorist attacks occurred; others describe notable incidents that occurred before 9/11, such as warnings issued by key individuals about the threat posed by al-Qaeda and discussions within government agencies about killing Osama bin Laden.

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Myers Learned of the Attacks on the World Trade Center

Many new timeline entries provide details of the response of Myers to the 9/11 attacks. Myers was at the time vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was out of the country for most of the day of September 11 and so Myers stood in for him as acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Time-Waster in Chief: General Richard Myers, the Highest-Ranking Military Officer in the U.S. During the 9/11 Attacks

Richard Myers

General Richard Myers was the highest-ranking military officer in the country when America came under terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, and yet he appears to have done nothing that would have helped protect the nation while the attacks took place.

Myers was, in September 2001, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--the second-highest-ranking officer in the U.S. military. However, when the 9/11 attacks occurred, General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was out of the country and so Myers was the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and took on the chairman's responsibilities until Shelton returned to the United States late in the afternoon of September 11.

Donald Trump and the Next Wave of 9/11 Truth Telling

Happy Belated New Year.

With Barack Obama leaving the White House and his own 9/11 legacy to be held to account, a few questions really must be asked about how a President Trump figures into the history of 9/11.

1. Is President Elect Trump and his Justice Department going to be open to allowing lawsuits and inquiries to go forward?

2. How Truth is Trump?

Trump is willing to call out fake news media in a way that has never happened before by any contemporary President. Maybe I missed it but the only thing that hasn't been lobbed at him is 9/11 Truth "conspiracy" sympathizer.

Do we have any evidence that Donald Trump knows more about 9/11 from public comments then or now?

In this first clip around 2:35, Trump sounds shades of Jerome Hauer in his answer to the reporter who asks how a building that was made to take plane impacts could be destroyed.

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