Most of the new entries in the last week have concerned the "red herring" Delta 1989, which was a suspected hijack in the day of 9/11, but was never taken over by terrorists. Shortly after the hijacking of United 93, both Delta 1989 and other aircraft had+to+turn+to+avoid+the+hijacked+airliner, and, shortly after the Pentagon was hit, Delta Air Lines ordered+the+plane+to+land+in+Cleveland, but did not tell the FAA. The pilot then changed course and failed+to+respond+to+an+FAA+message, causing the FAA to think it may be a hijack. However, when the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) told the FAA the Delta plane was a confirmed+hijack at 9:45 a.m., an FAA controller disagreed.

I have found a photograph of Tom+Wilshire, the CIA officer involved in pretty much all the pre-9/11 intelligence failings. It is here. I don't reproduce it here for reasons of copyright, although I guess I could claim fair use. The photo was taken when he testified to Congress about the al-Qaeda threat in late 2001.

I have to say he looks a lot older than I thought he was, but I guess people never seem the way you imagine them.

I also read a lot of articles about the testimony and found the transcript. They all refer to him as Tom Wilshere (with two "e"s), so perhaps this is the correct spelling of his name and the one we use is wrong. We got the spelling from Lawrence Wright, who mentioned Wilshire in his 2006 Pullitzer Prize-winning book The Looming Tower and a New Yorker article that accompanied the book, but was focused on FBI agent Ali+Soufan.

The CIA assassination programme that was recently in the media was actually first partially revealed by the Washington Post in 2005, when details enabling his originator to be identified were published. The programme made news in the last few days as CIA Director Leon Panetta admitted that the agency withheld information about it from Congress, although the CIA never actually used it to assassinate anybody. Nevertheless, the programme’s “duties” seem to have been taken over by something journalist Seymour Hersh called an “executive assassination wing” that was run out of the Office of Vice President Dick Cheney, and this grouping did go on missions and kill people.

The programme was first mentioned in Dana Priest’s groundbreaking article that highlighted the existence of the CIA’s network of black sites, CIA Holds Terror Subjects in Secret Prisons, which was published in November 2005. Priest wrote of the programme:

"The CTC's chief of operations argued for creating hit teams of case officers and CIA paramilitaries that would covertly infiltrate countries in the Middle East, Africa and even Europe to assassinate people on the list, one by one.

Some of the recently added entries go into more detail about the 9/11 Commission, which discovered the FAA was withholding+documents from it in September 2003 and issued its first+subpoena for them a month later. Soon after, the commission also subpoenaed the Pentagon, despite a last-ditch bid to avert it by the commission’s+Vice+Chairman+Lee+Hamilton, a good friend of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. In addition, Commissioner John Lehman repeatedly told the White House of Saudi links to the 9/11 plotters, but the administration was uninterested.

The US military conducted a training exercise in the five days before the September 11 attacks that included simulated aircraft hijackings by terrorists, according to a 9/11 Commission document recently found in the US National Archives. In one of the scenarios, implemented on September 9, terrorists hijacked a London to New York flight, planning to blow it up with explosives over New York.

The undated document, entitled "NORAD EXERCISES Hijack Summary," was part of a series of 9/11 Commission records moved to the National Archives at the start of the year. It was found there and posted to the History Commons site at Scribd by History Commons contributor paxvector in the files of the commission's Team 8, which focused on the failed emergency response on the day of the attacks. The summary appears to have been drafted by one of the commission's staffers, possibly Miles Kara, based on documents submitted by NORAD.

An FBI informant knew that one of the 9/11 hijackers breached the terms of his visa by working illegally, according to a 9/11 Commission document released by the National Archives at the start of the year. The document, a memo on the interview of the informer, Abdussattar Shaikh, was found in the archives by History Commons contributor paxvector and posted to the History Commons site at Scribd.

The memo shows that:

* Shaikh knew that one of the hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi, worked illegally in the US. According to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, the job was at a gas station run by people who the FBI had investigated over terrorism links.
* He knew Alhazmi was interested in news about the war in Chechnya, and became angry when the Russians did well.
* Instead of using the apartment phone, Alhazmi and Almihdhar would drive to another neighbourhood to use a pay phone, apparently a vain attempt to avoid NSA surveillance.

Several of the new entries in the past couple of weeks concern leading radical cleric and British intelligence informer Abu Hamza al-Masri and his activities in Yemen. Despite having been an informer for the British security services since early 1997, in around June 1998 he concluded a training+and+funding+agreement with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic Army of Aden (IAA), which by this time had already become irksome+to+local+authorities. He issued a warning+of+an+attack in Yemen in October, and a series+of+bombings+was+planned.

New details have emerged about minders who sat in on 9/11 Commission interviews during a fact-finding trip to Canada. Commission heads Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton mentioned the minders generally in interviews during the panel’s lifetime, but a memo recently found in the National Archives and blogged here a couple of weeks ago showed how prevalent they were.

Another document, again found by History Commons contributor paxvector, provides more details of how the minders worked during a trip to Canada. The commission, which eventually recommended taking part of the CIA director’s responsibilities away and giving them to a Director of National Intelligence, was considering changes to the intelligence community and sent a team to Canada to examine how its intelligence services were organised and report back.

Documents recently found in the National Archives cast doubt on the integrity of the 9/11 Commission’s Executive Director Philip Zelikow. In an e-mail exchange with author Philip Shenon, Zelikow claimed that he first learned of a dispute on the commission over the investigation of false statements made by NORAD and FAA officials after it had been “percolating for a while” and was not involved in the initial stages of the argument. However, an e-mail chain (scroll down) found in the Archives by History Commons contributor paxvector shows that Zelikow had been involved in the issue from very near the beginning.

Zelikow made the claim he was not involved in the initial stages of the dispute in response to an allegation made by commission staffer John Azzarello and relayed by Shenon. After the staff investigators drafted a memo for the commissioners in early April 2004 outlining why they thought NORAD and FAA officials had deliberately lied to them to overstate the military’s readiness during the attacks, Zelikow “just buried that memo,” according to Azzarello. In response, Zelikow claimed that he had not even known of the issue at the start. The implication was that, as he had not known of it, it could not be him that was orchestrating--or even involved in--a dispute between the staff investigators and the commission’s lawyers, Daniel Marcus and Steve Dunne.

However, the newly found e-mail chain shows Zelikow did know of the issue in April, raising the question as to why he falsely told Shenon he did not. Zelikow is not known to be linked to the FAA, but, if the commission had referred the matter to the Justice Department and it had started a perjury investigation against NORAD officials, this would certainly have had the potential to embarrass his friends at the Pentagon. Zelikow is alleged to have husbanded the issue to ensure a less potentially embarrassing referral to the inspectors general of the FAA and Defense Department, who in the end blamed the false statements on innocent mistakes and poor logkeeping.

A document recently discovered in the National Archives shows that, in a memo to the 9/11 Commission’s chairman and vice-chairman on false statements made by NORAD and FAA officials about the failure of US air defenses, the commission’s Executive Director Philip Zelikow failed to mention the possibility of a criminal referral. This supports allegations that Zelikow “buried” the option of a criminal referral by the commission to the Justice Department for a perjury investigation. The document was found at the National Archives by HistoryCommons contributor paxvector and posted to the History Commons site at Scribd.

A new document obtained from the 9/11 Commission’s files shows that the DNA of one of the alleged 9/11 hijackers, presumed Flight 93 pilot Ziad Jarrah, was positively identified. A sample taken from the plane’s crash site in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, was matched with a sample taken by German authorities from the residence of his girlfriend. The document was found at the National Archives by History Commons contributor paxvector, and posted at the History Commons site at Scribd.

DNA samples of fourteen of the nineteen hijackers were reportedly found at the three crash sites after the attacks. However, it was previously thought that the DNA samples were only identified by a process of elimination–if a DNA sample at a crash site did not match that of a victim it was presumed to be from a hijacker. In addition, the FBI took DNA samples from places–such as hotel rooms–it thought the hijackers had been and matched them with the non-victim samples from the crash sites.

Most of the new entries recently posted to the 9/11 Timeline concern the 9/11 Commission, in particular contacts between its executive director Philp Zelikow and White House official Karl Rove. Rove called Zelikow at the commission twice+in+June+2003 and again that September. When the commission's staff found out about the calls, they were furious and Zelikow told his secretary to stop+logging+his+calls. Zelikow also reportedly understated the amount of his contacts with Rove in an interview with a reporter.

A recently released 9/11 Commission memo highlights the role of government “minders” who accompanied witnesses interviewed by the commission. It was added to the National Archives’ files at the start of the year and discovered there by History Commons contributor paxvector.

The memo, entitled “Executive Branch Minders’ Intimidation of Witnesses,” complains that:

* Minders “answer[ed] questions directed at witnesses;”
* Minders acted as “monitors, reporting to their respective agencies on Commission staffs lines of inquiry and witnesses’ verbatim responses.” The staff thought this “conveys to witnesses that their superiors will review their statements and may engage in retribution;” and
* Minders “positioned themselves physically and have conducted themselves in a manner that we believe intimidates witnesses from giving full and candid responses to our questions.”

Most of the recently published entries at the 9/11 Timeline focus on the day of the attacks. The Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), which had been briefed on the possibility+of+a+plane+hitting+the+WTC at some time before 9/11, asked Langley Air Force Base to get a third plane ready to launch at 9:10 or shortly after, meaning that the unit there would+have+no+supervisor+of+flying. It also took control+of+Washington+airspace and directed the Langley fighters to the White House at 9:36, around the same time tankers+refuelled+jets launched from Otis Air Force Base near New York.

Former 9/11 Commission Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton recently made some bizarre comments about the Zacarias Moussaoui case in an interview for Vanity Fair. The interview was used for a wide-ranging and very interesting oral history of the Bush White House. Hamilton’s comments appear to show complete ignorance of a key aspect of the investigation of which he was vice chair.

Moussaoui was arrested on an immigration violation due to suspicious he was planning to hijack an aircraft by the Minneapolis FBI on 16 August 2001, nearly four weeks before 9/11. His personal effects contained evidence linking him to eleven of the nineteen alleged hijackers and the local FBI suspected that he was part of a wider plot. It correctly assumed a search of the effects would uncover his links to the other conspirators. However, due to obstruction by FBI headquarters, no warrant was ever granted to search Moussaoui’s belongings. Middle managers at headquarters also failed to properly inform their superiors of the case.

Here are Hamilton’s comments on the Moussaoui case:

Several of the new entries added to the 9/11 Timeline over the last couple of weeks focus on the issue of Londonistan--co-operation between radicals and British authorities. Shortly after 9/11, a Spanish judge named radical cleric Abu Qatada as al-Qaeda's+spiritual+leader+in+Europe, although Abu Qatada was also an informer for British intelligence who had been convicted in the Millennium+bomb+plot+trial in Jordan. In the early 1990s, imam Bakri Mohammed called for the assassination+of+British+Prime+Minister+John+Major and Bakri also worked for the British at some point, as did Abu Hamza, who linked up with an al-Qaeda+recruiting+sergeant in 1999. Meanwhile, the British had failed+to+act on intelligence that could have prevented a wave of attacks in France.

A couple of weeks ago I submitted several questions to James Bamford, who was doing a public Q and A to mark the showing of a PBS Nova documentary he had helped make about an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen, the hiding of two of the 9/11 hijackers from the FBI by the CIA and the warrantless wiretapping controversy.

Bamford answered one of my questions (as well as lots put by other people). It was:

"Did the NSA’s inspector general write reports covering the NSA’s failures before (a) the 1998 embassy bombings, (b) the 2000 USS Cole bombing, (3) 9/11? In each case the NSA had intercepted calls to/from al-Hada that could have been exploited to prevent the attacks, but did nothing with them. If the inspector general did draft such reports, what do they say?"

He replied:

"I know of no IG reports written on those incidents. In the past, most of the IG reports have dealt with employee complaints and not about failed policies."

Not a definitive answer, but helpful nonetheless.

Continued here

I just watched PBS Nova’s Spy Factory with James Bamford and I have a number of comments about it, both good and bad.

Starting off with the good, having been writing about al-Qaeda’s communications hub in Yemen for the last two years, I was thrilled to actually see it on the screen. Bamford actually went to Yemen and filmed it from the outside, shame he didn’t go in.

(snip)

The first and most glaring omission is Alec Station deputy chief Tom Wilshire, who was not mentioned at all in the programme. It went into some detail about the blocking of the cable written by Doug Miller, an FBI detailee to Alec Station, to FBI headquarters about Almihdhar’s US visa, but this was attributed merely to the CIA officer we refer to as “Michelle.” Wilshire was her boss, she blocked the cable on his orders, and Bamford knows this well—he wrote it in the book this programme was based on.

Most of this week's new entries in the 9/11 Timeline are about one of the best-known pre-9/11 failures. After tracking alleged Pentagon hijacker Khalid Almihdhar from Yemen to Dubai in January 2000, the CIA learned he had a US visa. An FBI agent named Doug Miller on loan to Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, drafted a cable to the bureau warning them of the visa, and that Almihdhar would soon probably arrive in the US. However, another Alec Station officer, known only as "Michelle," said their boss, Deputy Station Chief Tom Wilshire, did not want the cable to be sent. Michelle then sent out a cable falsely+stating+that+the+information+about+Almihdhar's+visa+had+been+passed+to+the+FBI. Miller complained to Mark Rossini, a fellow FBI agent on loan to Alec Station, and Rossini went to see Michelle, who told him the FBI would not be told of Almihdhar's visa because she+knew+the+next+al-Qaeda+attack+was+going+to+be+in+Southeast+Asia.

I made YouTube videos of three calls on the NEADS tapes (channel 7). They are calls by Boston Center military liaison Colin Scoggins to NEADS about "Phantom Flight 11." The first two are mentioned in the 9/11 Commission report, but the third one isn't, so I guess that's the one that's really interesting. ;)

(audio links below the fold)

I've been listening to the NEADS tapes again and I came across this:

At about 9:16 one of the operators says, "Be careful what we say on the loop, because these are being recorded and these tapes will be handed over."

This is from tape 15, about 38:00.

I finally found something interesting on the NEADS tapes and made it into a YouTube clip. It is when they learn of the second hijack. They think it's funny and make jokes.

I don't know what this means, but it just stood out for me, so I put it up.

The National Archives today released a set of records the 9/11 Commission gave it. It did so today because the commission told it it had to wait until 2009 to do so, presumably on the off chance that people would have forgotten about it all by then. The records are in two groups, Memorandums for the Record (MFR), which are available online, and other records, which are not available online.

I have been trawling through the ones that are available online and I have learned a few things of interest.

(1) Stacks of the MFR are not actually available. Either they have not been reviewed yet, or have been withdrawn because they are very classified, or they have been made available, but have had the bejesus redacted out of them.

(2) Two of the two key MFR, ...

Continued here.

Most of this week's additions to the 9/11 Timeline focus on the 9/11 Commission, in particular its treatment of the August 6 Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) item entitled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US." Philip Zelikow, the commission's executive director, allegedly pressured one of the CIA analysts who wrote the PDB to accept+the+White+House's+interpretation of what it said, but this conversation was overheard by a staffer, who reported it through a back-channel+network+used+to+monitor+Zelikow's+behaviour. Zelikow tried+to+prevent+a+formal+interview of the CIA analysts who wrote the PDB item, but was unsuccessful and they told the commission the PDB was neither+"historical"+nor+ordered+by+Bush.

Most of this week’s new entries in the 9/11 Timeline again deal with the day of 9/11, shortly before which NORAD was preparing+a+major+war+game. On the day itself, the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) called an air defence unit in Atlantic City, just before the first plane hit the World Trade Center, but the phone was+not+answered. FAA manager Ben Sliney began+responding+to+the+crisis around the same time and the air space over New York was closed after the second plane hit.

Many of this week's new entries in the 9/11 Timeline again cover the day of 9/11. The control tower at Otis Air Force Base, from which fighters were launched to intercept the hijacked airliners, called Otis operations center shortly+after+8:34+a.m. and the military liaison at Boston Center, Colin Scoggins, updated+NEADS around the same time. After the first crash, FAA manager Ben Sliney failed+to+realize it was Flight 11 that had hit the WTC, but Scoggins wondered+if+it+was.

The main area for new entries in the 9/11 Timeline this week is the day of 9/11. A sergeant at NEADS passed on news of Flight 11's hijacking to colleagues at 8:38+a.m., after which NEADS technicians attempted+to+locate+the+flight. Flight 175 entered New York Center's airspace, making radio contact, at 8:40+a.m., shortly after which the military liaison at Boston Center called+New+York+Center about Flight 11's hijacking. The order to launch fighters from Otis air force base was given at 8:45+a.m., although New Jersey Air National Guard fighters on a training mission at the same time were unaware+of+the+attacks.

Several of the new additions to the 9/11 Timeline this week concern the 9/11 Commission, in particular its executive director Philip Zelikow, who played a significant role in shaping the commission's take on assistance allegedly provided to the 9/11 hijackers by elements linked to the Saudi government. First, he blocked+requests+for+interviews by commission investigators researching the allegations, then he denied them access to a key document, the 28+redacted+pages+from+the+Congressional+Inquiry, and finally he fired+one+of+the+investigators.

All the new entries this week are about tracking of terrorists, in particular the 9/11 hijackers, as they moved between countries. Until the early 1990s, the CIA produced a Redbook that instructed immigration inspectors on how to spot terrorists by examining their passports. However, publication+ceased just before the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, which was unfortunate because some of the 9/11 hijackers had the same indicators of terrorist affiliation in their passports as three of the WTC bombers. When a top al-Qaeda support site in Europe was raided in Italy in 1995, two copies+of+the+Redbook+were+found+there.

Over the last few months, former diplomat and author Peter Dale Scott has published a series of articles about one of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar, and the parallels between his handling by Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, and events in the 1960s, such as an apparent CIA operation involving Lee Oswald, John Kennedy’s alleged assassin. They are Deep+Events+and+the+CIA's+Global+Drug+Connection, The+JFK+Assassination+and+9/11:+the+Designated+Suspects+in+Both+Cases and The+Assassinations+of+the+1960s+as+“Deep+Events”.

”Errors”