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Kevin Fenton's blog
Al-Qaeda in Spain, 9/11 Commission’s Investigation of NSA, Torture – Additions as of April 27, 2008
More material has been added covering the NSA's surveillance of Ahmed al-Hada, father-in-law of alleged Pentagon hijacker Khalid Almihdhar. Both President+Bush and Vice+President+Cheney used the non-exploitation of calls between his phone in Yemen and the hijackers in the US to justify the NSA's warrantless wiretapping program in January 2006. Attorney General Michael Mukasey and Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell attributed the failure to trace the calls to a 1981+executive+order earlier this year, and Mukasey bizarrely then claimed that one of the calls was between the US and Afghanistan,+rather+than+Yemen. This confused+the+media+somewhat, and a group+of+congressmen asked Mukasey for an explanation.
There are additional entries about the day of 9/11. A senior official later+disputed+Richard+Clarke's+account of the day's events, some Pentagon security cameras did+not+show+the+crash+site, and the fighters who later responded to the Pentagon attack attended+anti-terrorism+training earlier in the day. There is a dispute over which+gate+American+11+left+from at Boston airport, where suspicious+passengers arrived on September 10, when Larry Silverstein's publicist cancelled+an+appointment+at+the+WTC for 9/11. Other entries point out United+93's+autopilot+was+turned+off, top air force officials continued+with+a+meeting when they learned the WTC had been hit, and crew on United 93 had previously attended antiterrorism+training. Pilots on American+77, American+11 and United+93, were allocated to their flights shortly before 9/11.
Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Italy and Canada; Bernard Lewis, Rich B, and Osama bin Laden - Additions as of April 13, 2008
This week's new entries cover a number of varied topics. An address book seized in 1997 provided an opportunity to uncover al-Qaeda cells in Canada, where no+action was taken against a founder of al-Qaeda despite evidence against him, although the Pakistani army did at least shoot+him+dead in 2003. However, his son became an informer+for+the+CIA and uncovered a Bosnian+network+sending+fighters+to+Iraq
Attorney General Michael Mukasey has admitted that he garbled his claim about the pre-9/11 intercept of a call between an al-Qaeda facility overseas and the 9/11 hijackers in the US last week. Today he told the Senate:
"One thing I got wrong. It didn’t come from Afghanistan. I got the country wrong."
I have been all over this and I know the other end of the call was in Yemen. Here is the timeline we compiled:
This is a huge issue for us. If people knew that the NSA was intercepting calls between the 9/11 hijackers in the US and a phone registered to a guy (Ahmed al-Hada) who had previously helped bin Laden murder about 240 people (including 29 Americans), but didn't bother to trace the calls, what would they think about 9/11?
The 9/11 Commission knew about this, but included only two cryptic references to it in its report. This reflects very badly on the 9/11 Commission.
This week was a very busy week for the 9/11 Timeline, and dozens of new entries were published. New material, and a new chapter, has been added to cover superstar arms dealer Victor Bout, who was assisted by a former+US+intelligence+officer, was known to the CIA as supplier to the Taliban+and+al-Qaeda+before+9/11, and is said to have transported heroin out of Afghanistan. He sold+aircraft to the Taliban and the US created+a+team+of+catch+him+in+1999, but the Bush administration lost+interest+in+apprehending+him. Instead, he was hired to help US in Iraq, not once, but repeatedly. Whilst supporting the US in Iraq, he also supported Islamic+militants+in+Somalia and Hezbollah, but was finally arrested last month.
Glenn Greenwald has a new piece out about the Mukasey comments at his blog:
In response to the growing controversy over plainly misleading comments by Attorney General Michael Mukasey last week in San Francisco, and in response to the questions I submitted, the DOJ's Peter Carr, its Principal Deputy Director of Public Affairs, sent me the following email:
In a question-and-answer session after his Commonwealth Club speech last week, Attorney General Mukasey referenced a call between an al Qaeda safe house and a person in the United States. The Attorney General has referred to this before, in the letter he sent with Director of National Intelligence McConnell to Chairman Reyes on February 22, 2008. In that letter, contained in this link [.pdf], the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence explained that:
Continued at link:
Jon Gold has been kind enough to let me write an introduction to one of his Who Is? series. It deals with Margaret Gillespie, the FBI agent who discovered that two of the 9/11 hijackers were in the US shortly before the attacks:
Margaret Gillespie was an FBI agent who, while detailed to Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, was involved in the search for Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi in the summer of 2001. She attended the stormy 11 June meeting between the CIA and FBI and, at the suggestion of CIA manager Tom Wilshire, performed a low-key review of al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit, where the CIA let two of the 9/11 hijackers slip through their fingers in early 2000. Because Wilshire only told her to perform the review in her “free time,” she did not find and realise the significance of CIA cables indicating Almihdhar and Alhazmi had entered the US until 21 August 2001 – even though the review started in May. However, she immediately called the FBI, alerting them they should look for the two, and had Almihdhar, Alhazmi, an alias for their associate Khallad bin Attash, and an Iraqi named Ahmad Hikmat Shakir watchlisted on 23 August.
Al-Qaeda operative and suspected mole for Jordanian intelligence and the CIA
Khalil Deek is a naturalised US citizen and an extremist connected to both al-Qaeda and Hamas. There were a number of points in his career when he should have been investigated, arrested, or kept in custody, but the investigations inexplicably ended or even failed to get off the ground. For example, the FBI would normally be expected to take a dim view of a plan to blow up LAX, but Deek’s obvious participation in the Millennium Plot does not seem to have excited the authorities much.
9/11 Commission, Al-Qaeda in Italy, Hijackers - 9/11 Timeline Additions for Week Ending March 30, 2008
New entries this week cover a wide variety of topics. Regarding the 9/11 Commission, members and staff were dismayed by Laurie+Mylroie's+Iraq-al-Qaeda+potboiler, as was a CIA+expert who had the misfortune to sit on the same panel as Mylroie, and the Jersey+Girls. Staffers were appalled by executive director Philip Zelikow's rewriting of a staff statement to imply Iraqi connections to al-Qaeda, and forced him to back+down.
Attorney General Michael Mukasey is the latest government official to lie about the Yemen hub calls, which he used as a justification for the NSA's+warrantless+wiretapping+programme. The San+Francisco+Chronicle reports:
Before the 2001 terrorist attacks, he said, "we knew that there had been a call from someplace that was known to be a safe house in Afghanistan and we knew that it came to the United States. We didn't know precisely where it went. You've got 3,000 people who went to work that day, and didn't come home, to show for that."
Most entries added to the 9/11 Timeline this week deal with terrorism finance in general and the criminal Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in particular. Between 1979 and 1991, the US government received over+700+tips about criminal activities by BCCI, which repeatedly+saved+Pakistan+from+financial+ruin and funneled money to A.+Q.+Khan's+nuclear+program, but essentially ignored all 700 of them. BCCI dominated the supply chain of CIA+supplies+and+weapons+for+the+Afghan+mujaheddin and was also used by the CIA to pay 500+British+informants and for another slush+fund, of which the CIA failed to notify US customs. The NSC gained a clear+picture of BCCI's criminal activities from CIA reports, but a US+senator+was+kept+in+the+dark+about+them. The Pakistani government allowed drug+traffickers to use BCCI, which was linked to Osama+bin+Laden, and a huge+munitions+explosion towards the end of the Soviet-Afghan war hid the fact that that money for the mujaheddin was being diverted to A. Q. Khan.
Elsewhere in terrorism finance, an address book recovered in a raid linked an al-Qaeda operative to a Saudi+billionaire, the IIRO and the Muslim World League are part of the Saudi+government according to testimony, and Persian+Gulf+sheikhs+ allegedly gave bin Laden US$ 50 million in a handy single transfer in 1999. The government of Saudi Arabia refused to help capture a key Hezboallah figure in 1996, made little+effort to fight terrorism financing before 2002, and was still not properly overseeing+charities in 2007. In addition, militant operatives were told to use a prominent+Saudi+bank and a known terrorism financier was removed from UN and US blacklists when he+promised+not+to+do+it+anymore.
Imam Anwar Al Aulaqi, an associate of Khalid+Almihdhar+and+Nawaf+Alhazmi, was inexplicably+allowed+to+leave+the+US in 2002, and arrested and let+go in Yemen in 2007. The US finally determined he was linked to al-Qaeda in 2008.
Miscellaneous new entries include the US monitoring a "very+important+source" in Sudan around the time of the 1998 embassy bombings, but letting two+of+the+apparent+bombers+escape. A 1994 US intelligence report concluded Islamic+militants+would+take+power+in+Egypt, fighters were not ready to launch on 9/11 from Syracuse+air+base even after 10:00 a.m., the CIA tested an al-Qaeda training camp for chemical+weapons in 2001, and an attack on oil+facilities+in+Yemen was foiled in 2006. Finally, Presidents Reagan and Bush facilitated the Islamic bomb by repeatedly+and+falsely+certifying Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapons program, despite knowing that it did.
9/11 Timeline Update - Day of 9/11, Hijackers, the Saudi Connection - Additions as of March 16, 2008
There is a ton of new material about the Day of 9/11. There are more entries about the shootdown+order, which could have been issued around+9:38+a.m., about+9:50+a.m., after+10:00+a.m., or about+10:18+a.m. Regarding military exercises, some NEADS staff were still unsure whether the day's military exercises had ended at+10:00+a.m., fighters from Otis were recalled from a training+mission+at+about+9:03+a.m. and other+jets+on+training+were+sent+home+at+about+9:35+a.m. There were communication problems at NORAD+and+NEADS, which requested help from another air+defence+section+around+10:00, and also for the three pilots scrambled+from+Langley.
Regarding Flight 93, the Regional Operations Center was notified of the hijack at 9:40+a.m., a business+jet was asked to help locate the crash site, and a local+farmer+flew+over+the+site,+taking+pictures. President Bush learned of the attack on the Pentagon shortly+after+it+happened and requested security+for+his+family. Otherwise, the fighters from Otis left their holding pattern at+9:13+a.m., Richard Clarke learned of a plane+approaching+the+White+House+at+9:37+a.m., and a pilot from Langley AFB surveyed the Pentagon just+after+it+was+hit. The FAA and military still would not say if jets were launched in+the+evening, but the CIA's Near East Division figured out bin Laden was behind the attacks when the+second+plane+hit+the+WTC.
There are also numerous new entries about the 9/11 hijackers, of whom much video+footage+remains+unreleased. There is considerable confusion over the Flight 93 hijackers' arrival at Newark before the attacks--Ziad+Jarrah+seems+to+have+arrived+on+three+different+flights+on+the+same+day--Marwan+Alshehhi+was+considered+a+deserter from the UAE army in April 2000, and Saeed+Algahmdi+was+inconveniently+seen+in+the+US before he officially arrived. The hijackers were seen with an unidentified+Middle+Eastern+male just before the attacks and the FBI failed to help a security guard identity+the+hijackers at Dulles airport. Mohamed+Atta's+car was queried by police, a warrant for his arrest was+issued, but Florida police failed+to+notice+it. Nawaf Alhazmi's rental car was checked+by+police+in+New+Jersey, but an FBI agent looking for him failed+to+find+entries+about+him+in+databases and failed+to+search+a+private+database for information about him.
There is more material about the "Saudi Connection." Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar allegedly told a US associate they wanted to crash+a+plane+into+a+building, but Alhazmi correctly suspected that Omar al-Bayoumi, who was seen with Hani+Hanjour and in whose apartment the hijackers allegedly stayed, was a Saudi+spy. In addition, phone calls suggest a link between+the+hijackers,+al-Bayoumi+and+an+al-Qaeda+linked+imam, one of the hijackers contacts was+deported+from+the+US+in+2003, and the Saudis don't want to extradite al-Bayoumi or+anyone+else.
Regarding the 9/11 Commission, the White House had a better relationship with Democrat+Lee+Hamilton than his Republican counterpart Tom Kean, who was shocked by the lack+of+information+in+Presidential+Daily+Briefings, whereas fellow commissioner Jamie Gorelick was shocked+by+the+specificity+of+warnings they contained.
Miscellaneous entries include a visit by British intelligence officials to the US on September+12,+2001, tacit US support for the cancellation+of+elections+in+Algeria, and a visit+by+Taliban+leaders+to+the+US. In addition, an al-Qaeda explosives trainer visited+Kosovo+in+1998, a US solider from the Bosnian war emerged+as+an+al-Qaeda+leader+in+Somalia, and KSM allegedly stayed in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, in 1999. What's more, Richard Clarke thought the US's Achilles heel was in the US+itself, bin Laden's main money-handler came to the attention of Canadian+intelligence+in+1997, and the US lost+a+Central+Asian+base+in+2005. Finally, hundreds of millions of dollars passed through bin+Laden+charity+fronts during the Soviet-Afghan War, and if you're wondering where the moderates are in Afghanistan, they're all dead - the+US-backed+mujaheddin+killed+them.
Originally posted here.
I have written a summary of the 9/11 Timeline's CIA Hiding Alhazmi and Almihdhar chapter. It begins:
Parts of the story of the CIA’s knowledge of the 9/11 hijackers have trickled out over the years since the attacks, contained in three reports, of the Congressional Inquiry, 9/11 Commission and Justice Department, as well as in books, in particular the Looming Tower by Lawrence Wright, and evidence presented at the trial of Zacarias Moussoaui. When all the information is put together, two conclusions stand out: everything that could have gone wrong did go wrong, and almost every time something went wrong, the same man was at the centre of the failure: Tom Wilshire, deputy chief of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, and later CIA liaison to the FBI.
A meeting in Malaysia
“A contributor to the History Commons has obtained a 298-page document entitled Hijackers Timeline (Redacted) from the FBI, subsequent to a Freedom of Information Act request. The document was a major source of information for the 9/11 Commission's final report. Though the commission cited the timeline 52 times in its report, it failed to include some of the document's most important material.
The printed document is dated November 14, 2003, but appears to have been compiled in mid-October 2001 (the most recent date mentioned in it is October 22, 2001), when the FBI was just starting to understand the backgrounds of the hijackers, and it contains almost no information from the CIA, NSA, or other agencies. This raises questions as to why the 9/11 Commission relied so heavily on such an early draft for their information about the hijackers.”
Summary of what the FBI document reveals:
I wrote a summary of the Yemen Hub chapter in the 9/11 Timeline. It is about the NSA listening to the hijackers' calls and how their explanation for why they didn't catch the hijackers based on the intercepts doesn't make any sense.
Yemen Hub: NSA was listening in on the 9/11 hijackers’ calls for years
And how this became the rationale for the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program
The “Yemen hub” was an al-Qaeda communications hub that fell under US surveillance in the mid-late 1990s and was also home to Khalid Almihdhar, said to have been on the plane that hit the Pentagon on 9/11. There are still many unanswered questions about the surveillance, such as why were the NSA and its fellow agencies unable to roll up the plot based on the intercepts? And how did it come to be used as the justification for the NSA’s current domestic warrantless program?
You can find it here:
As you may be aware, the History Commons (aka Center for Cooperative Research) has a lot of material in its timelines, but some of the chapters are pretty involved. For this purpose, I’m going to write a series of chapter summaries, briefly highlighting what each entry in a chapter is about. The first one is for Mamoun Darkazanli, an associate of “Hamburg Cell” hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, and Ziad Jarrah:
Mamoun Darkazanli is a Hamburg-based businessman and suspected al-Qaeda operative who is said to be connected to the 1998 East African embassy bombings. He was monitored by German and US intelligence and was close to the “Hamburg Cell” of 9/11 hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi and Ziad Jarrah. He is currently free.
I just found this at Informed Comment:
The USG Open Source Center sent out the following note, which points out that in scouring jihadi web sites, the analysts have found none where al-Qaeda has taken credit for assassinating Benazir Bhutto. You think of the announcement by al-Qaeda posted the morning of 7/7/05 when the London Underground was bombed. Yet they are not claiming this one. Curioser and curioser:
"FYI - - No Al-Qa'ida Claims for Bhutto Assassination Found on Jihadist Websites
Jihadist Websites -- OSC Summary
Monday, December 31,
FYI: No Al-Qa'ida Claims for Bhutto Assassination Found on Jihadist Websites
As of 1830 GMT on 31 December, OSC has not observed any official statements from Al-Qa'ida claiming responsibility for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on any of the websites that normally disseminate authenticated statements from the group. OSC will continue to monitor these websites for any such claims."
CIA Tapes, Partial Destruction and Content Thereof – Additions to 9/11 Timeline as of December 15, 2007
As you are probably aware, the media is full of stories about the destruction of CIA videotapes and sorting though this story is now our top priority. We have added two categories to deal with all the new information emerging, +Destruction+of+CIA+Interrogation+Tapes and +High+Value+Detainees, which you can find under the ‘War+on+Terrorism’+Outside+Iraq meta-category on the front page. The new events are:
Good on MSNBC for asking the question. The article begins:
When al-Qaida’s media arm released its first Osama Bin Laden video in nearly three years, most of the media attention was focused on Bin Laden's beard. It appeared either dyed — or perhaps even pasted on. He was ridiculed and a variety of theories were offered to explain it.
But now, there is a running debate among video analysts about whether al-Qaida faked the video altogether —that rather than being new, the September 7 message may have been something recorded at the same time as his last video in October 2004 (and then released with new audio).
More at link:
Krawetz makes a lot of sense to me.
I would like a translation of a Spanish article. It is about a guy named Amer el-Azizi, who seems to be involved in the Madrid train bombings and 9/11. It is interesting because it says he has a relationship with a Spanish security service. If there is somebody here who speaks Spanish and could translate it, then that would be good. Here it is:
El SUP afirma que el Cesid frustró la detención de Amer Azizi
April 29, 2004
MADRID.- El secretario general del Sindicato Unificado de Policía (SUP), José Manuel Sánchez Fornet, aseguró ayer que una «interferencia» del Cesid (antiguos servicios secretos, ahora CNI) frustró, en noviembre de 2001, la detención en Madrid del marroquí Amer Azizi, considerado un importante miembro de Al Qaeda.
En declaraciones a Efe, Sánchez Fornet afirmó que existe «una grabación policial» en la que se ve a dos agentes del Cesid llamando a la casa de Azizi, situada en la calle del Buen Gobernador en Madrid, lo que alertó a éste de que su domicilio estaba siendo vigilado y le hizo darse a la fuga.
The Khallad Identification, Day of, More Blind Sheikh, and Yemen – Additions to 9/11 Timeline as of October 6, 2007
A set of recent additions to the +9/11+Timeline deals with the identification of al-Qaeda leader +Khallad+bin+Attash for the CIA. The identification, made by an asset known as +Omar, placed bin Attash at al-Qaeda's Malaysia summit, with 9/11 hijackers +Nawaf+Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, who was connected to the +Cole+bombing and who the CIA +appears to have confused with bin Attash for a short while.
That's one of the headlines in today's Observer. The article starts:
"The key piece of material evidence used by prosecutors to implicate Libya in the Lockerbie bombing has emerged as a probable fake. Nearly two decades after Pan Am flight 103 exploded over Scotland on 21 December, 1988, allegations of international political intrigue and shoddy investigative work are being levelled at the British government, the FBI and the Scottish police as one of the crucial witnesses, Swiss engineer Ulrich Lumpert, has apparently confessed that he lied about the origins of a crucial 'timer' - evidence that helped tie the man convicted of the bombing to the crime."
I liked the last paragraph too:
"Few people apart from conspiracy theorists and investigative journalists working on the case were prepared to believe Bollier until the end of last month, when Lumpert, one of his former employees, walked into a Zurich police station and asked to swear an affidavit before a notary."
Those krazy konspiracy theorists were right after all!
The FBI performed so bad before 9/11 that it took four and a half years to get an unredacted version of the DOJ inspector general's report. The CIA performed so bad before 9/11 that it took nearly six years to get a redacted summary of its inspector general's report. The NSA performed so bad before 9/11 that it has not even admitted its inspector general wrote a report.
Given that the NSA was tapping the hijackers' phones, it surely has a couple of issues to address and explain to the public (for example: why did you let them do it?), but it has not done so as far as I can see. I have never heard of any NSA inspector general report and, when I had a look just now, I couldn't find anything. The NSA admits at its website that it has an inspector general and he is reputed to have begun work on at least one report (into warrantless wiretapping), so presumably he would write a report into the agency's failings before 9/11. However, I can't find a single trace of it. Can anybody help me out here? Is there at least a mention somewhere, anywhere of the NSA inspector general writing a report on the agency's performance before 9/11?
She says she is the Democrat best equipped to fight terrorists, but White House hopeful Sen. Hillary Clinton told New Hampshire voters Thursday that another attack on the United States would likely help Republican candidates at the polls.
"It's a horrible prospect to ask yourself, 'What if? What if?' " Clinton, a New York Democrat, told a house party in Concord, according to the New York Post and The Associated Press and confirmed by her campaign.
"But, if certain things happen between now and the election, particularly with respect to terrorism, that will automatically give the Republicans an advantage again, no matter how badly they have mishandled it, no matter how much more dangerous they have made the world."
There are two ways to interpret these comment. Naomi Wolf comes out in favour of the sensible one. Sample:
Intelwire just came up with this:
U.S. Secretly Met With Followers of Blind Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman Before Controversial Visa Application
Followers of Omar Abdel Rahman made overtures to U.S. diplomats one year before the radical sheikh entered the United States on a visa approved by a CIA agent.
During several meetings with diplomatic officers at the U.S. embassy in Cairo, members of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) provided extensive details about the operations of one of Egypt's most notorious terrorist organizations.
Initiated by al-Gama'a, the meetings were aimed at creating a dialogue with the U.S. in the hopes of eventual, unspecified cooperation. The initiative was based on a perception that the U.S. enjoyed similar cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
Less than four years after the approach, an al-Gama'a terror cell led personally by Abdel-Rahman bombed the World Trade Center in New York City.
Continued at link: http://intelwire.egoplex.com/2007_06_14_exclusives.html
It's taken from two embassy cables he obtained through FOIA requests. This is only a small tile in the mosaic, but it is really good work.
I just found this in Intelwire, which has a bunch of really great stuff. They say they have 500 pages of documentation to back it up.
Richard Perle, MPRI and Bosnian Arms Shipments
Connoisseurs of elaborate Bosnia conspiracy theories will love this (and don't think I don't know you're out there).
Controversial neocon philosopher Richard Perle led an obscure nongovernmental organization tasked with hiring a private company to run the U.S. State Department's "Train and Equip" program in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996.
Perle's group, the "Acquisition Support Institute," hired Military Professional Resources Inc., essentially a professional mercenary company nearly as controversial as Perle himself. It's not at all clear what or whom is responsible for the Institute, or why a "non-governmental, non-profit organization" would be responsible for selecting the recipient of a massive State Department contract on one of the most sensitive issues of the day.
There is a big piece in the Guardian today on Loose Change. You can find it here:
It is not a hit piece, but of the three or four points the article mentions, most people here would probably only agree with 1 of them: explosive demolition.
It is very disappointing to me that the other two, no-plane at the Pentagon and no-plane in Shanksville, get a mention, but many of our better arguments get ignored. What about Saeed Sheikh, Able Danger, the "hunt" for Osama, Sibel Edmonds, the fact the NSA was tapping one of the hijacker's phones for 3 years before 9/11, the dust, the visas, the fact that the hijackers thought they were being followed, the Malaysia meeting, all the warnings, war games on 9/11, bojinka, "3 individuals have been followed since Millenium and Cole", Jarrah in Dubai, David Schippers, etc., etc.?
The Sibel Edmonds chapter at the 9/11 Timeline has seen a lot of new entries recently and you can find the details of the whole story here:
January 14, 2002: FBI Special Agent Concerned That Translator Is Protecting Surveillance Targets and Involved in Espionage
The Malaysia meeting was a major planning session for 9/11 and was held from 5-8 January 2000 and attended by various al-Qaeda operatives, some of whom went on to participate in the operation. The CIA and NSA found out about it in advance by tapping one of the hijackers’ phones, so it was also surveilled by Malaysian intelligence and the results were passed to the CIA. However, no complete list of the attendees has ever been published.
In his book Intelligence Matters, Bob Graham, co-chairman of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, makes the following claim:
One of the organizers of the failed attack ((on the USS Sullivans)) was Muhammad Omar al-Harazi, an al-Qaeda operations chief in East Africa and one of the plotters of the Nairobi embassy bombing. Al-Harazi was personally humiliated by the failed attack. Two days later, he headed to Kuala Lumpur for the terrorist summit that the CIA knew was taking place. (p. 59)
Graham seems pretty solid as a source to me, so we can add al-Harazi to the other 6 generally accepted attendees (the total is supposed to be 13):
(1) Khalid Almihdhar, American 77 hijacker;
(2) Nawaf Alhazmi, American 77 hijacker;
This came up this week. I think it's quite important and shows why the 9/11 Commission believes its story of the day of 9/11 (I don't by the way).
Late October 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Tour of NEADS Facility Suspended Over Discrepancies
Several months into its investigation, the 9/11 Commission is already dissatisfied with the Department of Defense (see July 8, 2003). When its staff take a tour of a Northeast Air Defense Sector facility in Rome, New York, which helped coordinate the air defense on the day of 9/11, the staff enter the operations room, which has “more than twenty banks of operators: some weapons controllers and some flight controllers.” The staff find that the operators’ conversations are always tape-recorded, but the tapes for 9/11 have not yet been sent to the commission and, according to Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice-Chairman Lee Hamilton, “there were also discrepancies between things NORAD was telling [the commission] about their performance on the morning of September—things that the agency had stated publicly after 9/11—and the story told by the limited tapes and documents the commission had received.” Upon learning of the existence of the tapes, team leader John Farmer immediately suspends the tour and the interviews and flies to meet Kean in New Jersey. The commission subsequently subpoenas NORAD for the tapes (see October-November 2003), but, according to Kean and Hamilton, this means that “the staff had lost so much time that our hearing on the 9/11 story in the skies was postponed for months. Indeed, the delays from NORAD and the FAA made it highly unlikely that the team could complete its work as scheduled.” [Kean and Hamilton, 2006, pp. 85-88] Chapter 1 of the commission’s final report will draw heavily on the tapes. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 1-46] However, the commission does not make the same effort with all day of 9/11 recordings. For example, it does not even find out which person(s) from the Department of Defense participated in a White House video conference chaired by counter-terrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke during the attacks. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 36]